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An Enigma in the
Federal Income Tax:
The Meaning of the Word "Gift"
The exclusion of gifts from taxable income has long been
the subject of considerable debate. In an attempt to un-
cover a rational basis for the gift exclusion, Professor
Klein extensively examines its legislative history and
judicial application. He concludes that the gift ezcu-
sion is neither a product of reasoned legislative choice
nor a reflection of any legitimate tax policy. On the
basis of this conclusion, Professor Klein urges that Con-
gress re-evaluate the exclusion, in light of the under-
lying theory, with an eye toward formulating a more
justifiable tax treatment of gifts.
William A. Klein*
The familiar problem of deflning broad, general terms used in
any statute is always a formidable one. Although complete elimi-
nation of ambiguity would be too much to expect, satisfactory
progress toward that end may be made by identifying the nature
and the source of any conflict in goals that complicate the prob-
lem. When no such progress has been achieved over a long period
of time, then one is moved to ask the question "why not?" It
is this kind of question that has prompted the present article.
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Since the initial adoption of the modem income tax in 1913,
"property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance"' has
been expressly excluded from the broad enumeration of those re-
ceipts that are taxable as income.2 The problem of assigning a
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
1. Presently, INT. RV. CODE; Or 1954, § 102(a).
2. This nonexclusive enumeration is contained in ]-r. REv. CODr. OF 1954,
61(a).
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meaning to the term "gift" as used in that exclusion is the sub-
ject of the present inquiry.
The first reported case dealing with the issue was decided in
1924,' and since that time there has been a substantial flow of
decisions, with no sign of abatement. In 1953 Professor Chom-
mie was prompted to remark that the exclusion "has proved to
be a constant irritant both to taxpayers and the government."4
Six years later the Supreme Court elected to consider the prob-
lem,5 hopefully with the objective of soothing if not removing the
irritant; during the following year its views were announced in
three cases, the most noteworthy of which was Commissioner v.
Duberstein! Taxpayer Duberstein had obliged his business asso-
ciate, Berman, by giving the latter the names of potential cus-
tomers. Berman did not offer nor did Duberstein expect any
tangible reward for this information, but shortly thereafter the
magnanimous Berman "gave" Duberstein a Cadillac automobile.
The Commissioner claimed that the value of the automobile
should be taxed as income, while Duberstein claimed that it was
a nontaxable gift. The Tax Court held in favor of the Commis-
sioner,7 but it was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.' The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the Tax
Court, pointing out that the statute used the term "gift" in its
"colloquial sense,"9 that the issue was one of fact turning on the
"intention" of the transferor,'0 and that the decision of the Tax
Court, not having been "clearly erroneous," must be upheld."
The precise holding of the Court was not entirely clear,12 and
3. John H. Parrott, 1 B.TNA. 1 (1924), aff'd, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1920),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 754 (1927).
4. Chommie, Payments to Employees: Gifts or Compensation for Serv-
ices?, 81 TAXES 620 (1953).
5. Cert. granted, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 361 U.S. 923 (1959); Cert.
granted, Stanton v. United States, 361 U.S. 923 (1959).
6. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The other cases were Stanton v. United States,
363 U.S. 278 (1960) (consolidated with Commissioner v. Duberstein); United
States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960).
7. Mose Duberstein, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 16 (1958).
8. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959).
9. 363 U.S. at 285.
10. 363 U.S. at 286.
11. 363 U.S. at 291-92.
12. See, e.g., Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962). Com-
pare, e.g., Calechman, Recent Payments-to-Widows Cases Stress Facts; Plan-
ning Is Important, 14 J. TAXATION 308 (1961); Crown, Payments to Corporate
Executives' Widows, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. oN FED. TAX 815, 816, 826 (1961);
Hauser, Business Gifts and the Supreme Court, 38 TAXES 942, 948 (1960);
Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees, 40 TAXES 208, 213-14 (1962).
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the opinion did little, if anything, to narrow the ambiguity that
in earlier cases had proved to be inherent in the word "inten-
tion."' 3 In apparent recognition of its failure to provide any
new answers 'to that old problem, the Court observed that its
approach might not "satisfy an academic desire for tidiness."'
It satisfied even less the Government's, and presumably the prac-
ticing lawyer's, desire for a rule that would reduce the uncertainty
and the amount of litigation. Moreover, an examination of the
opinion fails to reveal the motivation for the Court's ruling. The
criticism evoked by this controversial decision was most elo-
quently summarized by Dean Griswold.' He limited his expres-
sion of profound displeasure with the opinion to a few pages and
concluded with this observation: "Come, gentlemen, you can't
do that." 6
Dean Griswold seems to imply that the persistence of uncer-
tainty and dissatisfaction is attributable to the obtuseness of the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court. He also seems to suggest
that there was one clearly indicated correct answer but that the
Court simply failed to see it' 7 The result reached by the Court,
however, seems to me to be one of a number of defensible alter-
natives; it is the process by which the Court arrived at and ex-
plained that result which seems responsible for the perpetuation
of confusion. Moreover, an understanding of the nature of the
problem requires an examination not only of the judicial process
but of the legislative process as well. In any event, the fact is
that the problem of determining the proper scope of the gift ex-
clusion has proved to be a surprisingly thorny one.
Before the reasons for the difficulty of the problem can be
clarified, the context in which it arises must be delineated. A
close reading of the decided cases indicates that the principal
area of litigable uncertainty is quite narrow. The bulk of the
13. But cf. Crown, supra note 12; Hauser, supra note 12.
14. 363 US. at 290.
15. Griswold, Foreword Of Time and Attitudes-Proassor Hart and
Judge Arno , TIw Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 Htnv. L. Ruv. 81, 88-91
(1960).
16. Id. at 90-91. Dean Griswold derived this admonition from an anecdote
and applied it to the Duberstein decision.
17.
Where the transaction clearly has commercial or economic elements,
where there is a quid pro quo, and no aspect of family love and affec-
tion, it would be more satisfactory ... to rule as a matter of law
that property transferred is not a "gift," rather than to leave each
such case to the apparently unguided surmise of the trier of the facts.
Id. at 89.
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cases involves payments by employers, most frequently corpora-
tions, to employees or their widows, where the payment had not
been bargained for and the employer was in no sense legally
obligated to make the payment.1 8 Because of this remarkable
homogeneity, the courts long ago could have developed a rela-
tively specific, narrow rule that would have eliminated most of
the litigation. In other words, certainty could easily have been
achieved without going beyond the problem immediately in view.
The courts could have defined the term "gift" to exclude pay-
ments motivated by an employment relationship." In fact, how-
ever, the courts have treated the question of gifts vel non as one
that turns principally on the "intention" of the payor2 0
18. In recent years cases dealing with payments by corporations to widows
of deceased corporate executives have provided the most litigation and attract-
ed the greatest attention. See Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees, 40
TAxEs 208 (1962); Note, Payments to Widows of Corporate Executives and
Employees- Gift or Income?, 49 VA. L. Rnv. 74 (1963). Apart from the wid-
ow cases, there have been over 140 decisions, including Treasury rulings, since
1920 that turned on the gift exclusion. Of these, 34 involved payments, most-
ly in the nature of bonuses, to employees of the payor where the employee
continued to work for the payor after the payment. There were 57 cases in-
volving payments to ordinary employees upon termination of employment
and five cases involving such payments to ministers by their congregations.
Thus, a total of 96 of the 141 cases clearly involved the employer-employee
relationship. Another 20 cases involved payments made where services had
been rendered by the payee to the payor but not pursuant to an employment
relationship; the Duberstein case falls into this category. These cases can
easily be lumped together with the employer-to-employee cases. Of the re-
maining 25 cases, 11 involved payments from the Government, and in some
of these the payee had rendered services, 6 cases were classified as miscel-
laneous, and 7 involved prizes and awards, now covered expressly by the
Code. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 74.
19. Dean Griswold suggested a somewhat broader rule that would have
covered cases like Duberstein as well as the cases involving employer-employee
relationships. See note 17 supra. In Duberstein the Commissioner argued that
a gift must be "prompted solely by personal affection towards the payee"
and not "by either anticipated benefit to the payor . . . or his sense of grati-
tude for the valuable services performed by the payee." Brief for Appellant,
p. 13, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). See also Chommie,
upra note 4, at 628. While such a test would dispose of most of the cases,
in favor of the Government, a limited area of dispute would remain: the cases
where the payee is a personal friend of the payor as well as an employee.
In such cases, a determination of which relationship prompted the gift would
dictate its tax treatment. See, e.g., Neville v. Brodrick, 235 Fad 263 (10th
Cir. 1956); Richard L. Harrington, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 960 (1958); Mi-
chael Laurie, 12 T.C. 86 (1949). However, these cases are relatively few in
number.
20. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960);
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
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The meaning of the word "intention" has been a constant
source of dispute. Perhaps the best clue to its meaning is found
in the Duberstein Court's statement that the term "gift" should
be used in a "colloquial sense.' - This suggests that the defini-
tion of "gift" is determined by the dominant mental image evoked
in the mind of the average man when that word is used.2 A judge
constructs this standard, of course, not by conducting an attitude
survey but by examining his own reaction and experiences. This
does not impose any serious limitation in the present instance,
however, since no "scientific" proof seems necessary to establish
that in the common image a gift is a transfer motivated by a
particular state of mind, such as a feeling of good will, affection,
or generosity 21L- the state of mind that is associated with "dona-
tive intent."
This type of subjective mental phenomenon defies precise de-
scription. The trier of fact can determine its existence only with
21. 363 'U.S. at 285.
22. Cf. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945), in which the Court,
taking an approach antithetical to that adopted in Duberatein, stated:
Had Congress taxed "gifts" impliciter, it would be appropriate to as-
sume that the term was used in its colloquial sense, and a search for
"donative intent" would be indicated. But Congress intended to use
the term "gifts" [for gift-tax purposes] in its broadest and most com-
prehensive sense... . Congress chose not to require an ascertainment
of what too often is an elusive state of mind. For purposes of the gift
tax it not only dispensed with the test of "donative intent." It formu-
lated a much more workable external test ....
Id. at 306.
23. In Dubrstein the Court, reiterating earlier formulations, stated: "A
gift .. . proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity' ... 'out of
affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.' " 363 US. at 285.
Much earlier, Judge Learned Hand had summed it up neatly, although with
a somewhat different emphasis, as follows: "A donor must not be moved
to satisfy some uneasiness, some scruple, some sense that there is an outstand-
ing claim which those would recognize to whose opinion he is sensitive:
something which makes the payment more than an unconstrained act of af-
fection or regard." Bogardus v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), ev'Ld
sub. nm. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 UIS. 34 (1937). Both these state-
ments seem close to what is probably the dominant image of a gift. On further
reflection one might -e compelled to adopt the modification urged by the
Government in Stanton v. United States, the companion case of Duberstein:
The idea . .. can be limited neither to free-flowing generosity nor to
"good" motivations. It is apparent that many admitted gifts are
prompted less by a freely-formed "desire" than by a sense of duty, per-
haps enforced by social pressures- e.g., a duty to one's family (pro-
viding for a disliked but needy relative), a duty to society (contribut-
ing annually to charity), or a duty to God (tithes).
Brief for Respondent, p. 80, Stanton v. United States, 363 US. 278 (1960).
9119
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great difficulty. Moreover, judicial definition and application of
such a vague test can result in the implicit adoption of standards
that substantially alter the basic concept. To take an illustra-
tion from another field, the term "negligence" can be defined by
a court in a manner that imports into the concept a rule of law
based on public policy considerations that have little to do with
the concept as originally formulated. Or a jury in "finding the
facts" can, consciously or unconsciously, apply the negligence
concept in a manner that gives effect to wholly extraneous fac-
tors. The cases dealing with the gift exclusion seem to manifest
an identical process. In the period from 1920 to 1937 the courts
gradually developed limitations on the concept of "donative in-
tent." Although a payment by an employer to an employee might
theoretically be a gift for tax purposes, as a practical matter, it
could not.24 This result could be reached by reasoning that cor-
24. This is, of course, a difficult proposition to establish. I rely in part
on sheer numbers. In the period from 1920 to the Supreme Court decision in
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937) there were 52 decisions in-
volving payments to current employees, termination payments, and payments
where some service bad been rendered. See note 18 supra. Of these only
eight held in favor of the taxpayer. In light of the number of years involved
and the changes in court personnel the results indicated by simple case count-
ing may be of limited value. I rely more heavily on the appropriate lan-
guage of the decisions and an appraisal of the decisional trend in relation to
the fact situation that was under consideration in each case reviewed. The
decisional trend may be summarized as follows: From the very outset the
decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals reflected a pro-government attitude.
See John H. Parrott, 1 B.T.A. 1 (1924), af'd, Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d G09
(4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 754 (1927). Although there were minor
lapses in the early years, e.g., Earl S. Gwin, 14 B.T.A. 393 (1928); Estate of
David R. Daly, 3 B.T.A. 1042 (1926), this attitude of the Board was firmly
entrenched by 1936. See, e.g., Walter M. Bickford, 34 B.T.A. 461 (1930); N.
H. Van Sicklen, Jr., 33 B.T.A. 544 (1935); James H. Anderson, 31 B.T.A.
197 (1934), aff'd mem., 79 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1935); Thomas M. Schumacher,
27 B.T.A. 895 (1933); C. B. Wilcox, 27 B.T.A. 580 (1933); Arthur L. Lougee,
26 B.T.A. 23 (1932), aff'd, 63 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1933); Mary G. Mulqueen,
25 B.T.A. 441 (1932). In the courts of appeals the trend is almost as clear.
The Third Circuit seemed to favor the taxpayer. Cunningham v. Commis-
sioner, 67 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1933); Jones v. Commissioner, 31 F2d 755
(3d Cir. 1929). But see Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.
1934). The Sixth Circuit seemed to be lined up with the Third Circuit.
Lunsford v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1933). But see Davis v.
Commissioner, 81 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1936). The Ninth Circuit also favored
the taxpayer in a 1929 opinion, before the pro-government forces prevailed.
Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929). Its attitude apparently had
changed somewhat by 1936. See Botchford v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 914
(9th Cir. 1936). On the government's side, however, was a much more im-
pressive array of cases. The most significant of these were the decisions of
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porations lack donative capacity.2 For example, one court stated
as a matter of fact that "corporations do not give presents unless
they get something for it financially." '- Another court concluded
that as a matter of law "a corporation cannot lawfully give away
its assets."' 7 But the impact was the same each way c for the
developing judicial attitude recognized virtually no payment
from an employer to an employee as a gift.
In 1937 the Supreme Court, in Bogardus v. CommissionerFD
made its first major contribution to the interpretation of the gift
exclusion. That case, a major taxpayer victory, constituted a
rejection of the approach that had been developed by the lower
courts; in fact, four separate courts of appeals had held in favor
of the Commissioner in related cases involving the Bogardus fact
situation 0 The main issue was whether a number of payments
to various employees upon the termination of a business should
be considered gifts. The Court emphasized that the owners of
the business had made a good profit on its sale and were in a
the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits that were overruled in Bogardus
v. Commissioner, 302 US. 34 (1937). See note 30 infra. There were others,
however. See Fitch v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1934); Levey v. Hel-
vering, 68 Fad 401 (D.C. Cir. 1933); United States v. McCormick, 67 Fad
867 (2d Cir. 1933); Bass v. Hawley, 62 F.d 721 (5th Cir. 1933).
25. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 Fad 764 (2d Cir. 1937); Noel
v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 US. 754 (1927).
26. Ira A. Kip, Jr., 3 B.T.A. 50, 51 (1925). See Levey v. Helvering, 68
Fad 401, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ("obviously the corporation had no interest
in giving away the corporate assets").
27. Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 Fad 971, 972 (3d Cir. 1934).
28. In Dubertein the Court rejected even a presumption that a corpora-
tion cannot make a gift, stating that "if it were applied as a determinative
rule of 'law,' it would force the tribunals trying tax cases involving the
donee's liability into elaborate inquiries into the local law of corporations
.. " 363 U.S. at 288. Perhaps the "elaborate inquiries" that the Court
feared really need not have been a cause for apprehension. The lower courts
had not found such inquiries necessary because the proposition seemed self-
evident. Of course, corporations may clearly make gifts to charities, but there
seems to be little basis to believe that they can also make non-charitable
gifts. See BAr & eNE, CORPORATioNS § 85 (1946); DODD & BAER, CAsEs
AND M&TmIAIS ON ConRoAierToNs 330-33 (Sd ed. 1951); 6A Firmnrcm, Cvcw-
PmIA or Prav± CouroRATioNs §§ 2939-40 (1950).
29. 802 U.S. 34 (1937). The Court had previously dealt with the issue
briefly in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). The
Old Colony Trust case established that the mere fact of a voluntary pay-
ment, without legal obligation, does not make it a gift.
30. Hall v. Commissioner, 89 Fad 441 (4th Cir. 1937); Simpkinson v.
Commissioner, 89 F2d 397 (5th Cir. 1937); Bogardus v. Helvering, 88 Fad
646 (2d Cir. 1937); Olsen v. Helvering, 88 Fad 650 (2d Cir. 1937); Walker
v. Commissioner, 88 Fad 61 (1st Cir. 1937).
1963]
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magnanimous mood, and this state of mind was the controlling
fact. Perhaps the Court's most significant contribution was its
comment that "a gift is none the less a gift because inspired by
gratitude for the past faithful service of the recipient."'" This
statement undercut a doctrine that had slowly developed in the
lower courts over the previous 17 years. 2
Bogardus apparently had a significant impact in some cases,a8
but in others the pro-government attitude seems to have per-
sisted 4 Moreover, Bogardus did not abate the struggle to find
objective evidentiary criteria for determining whether the re-
quired subjective "intention" existed.85 Consequently, the Court
found it necessary to consider the same issue some 23 years later
in the Duberstein case. But Duberstein seems merely to reaffirm
Bogardus, with a few refinements that may lend some support
to the Commissioner's position. The aftermath of Duberstein is
thus likely to be similar to the confusing and conflicting after-
math of Bogardus.
The general picture that emerges from the course of litigation
is one in which competing forces have been operating but have
never been fully resolved. There has been some effort to adhere
to the avowed rule that the question of whether a payment is a
31. 802 U.S. at 44.
32. For example, in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Bogardus, Judge Learned Hand stated: "We agree that a man
may make a gift to an old employee without meaning it as 'compensation';
though probably such cases will be uncommon, especially if he declares that
the payment is 'in recognition of' past services." 88 F.2d at 048.
83. See, e.g., Peters v. Smith, 221 F.2d 721 (Sd Cir. 1955); Adams v.
Riordan, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9770 (D. Vt. 1957); John J. Bradley, 1
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 207 (1954); Bert P. Newton, 11 T.C. 512 (1048); Charles
W. Wright, 7 Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1948).
84. See, e.g., Carragan v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 24a (Rd Cir. 1952);
Poorman v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1942); Willkie v. Com-
missioner, 127 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942); Painter v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp.
508 (N.D. Tex. 1953); Ruth Jackson, 25 TiC. 1106 (1956); L. Gordon Walk-
er, 25 T.C. 832 (1956).
85. Among the objective criteria most frequently relied on were the treat-
ment of the payment on the books of the payor, the label used by the payor,
and whether the shareholders sanctioned the payment. See Chommie, supra
note 4, at 622-24; Rothschild, Business Gifts as Income, N.Y.U. 19Tu INST. ON
FED. TAx 147 (1961).
36. Indeed, the confusion and conflict has already appeared. It has been
observed that since Duberstein the courts have been "in an extraordinary
state of disharmony" and their "confusion may be attributed to conflicting
judicial interpretations" of the Duberstein opinion. Note, Payments to Wid-
ows of Corporate Executives and Employees -Gifts or Income? 49 VA. L.
REv. 74, 76 (1963). See Yohlin, supra note 12, at 218-14.
[Vol. 48:215
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gift depends on the state of mind of the payor -on whether
the payment was prompted by a "donative intent." The Supreme
Court has twice insisted on this approach. On the other hand,
the holdings as well as the language of many of the lower-court
cases reveal strong support for the propositions that the tax lia-
bility of the payee should not turn on the payor's state of mind
and that a payment to an employee or to a nonemployee who
has rendered some service to the payor cannot be a gift for tax
purposes. An explanation for the persistence of this conflict lies,
to a significant degree, in the courts' failure to perceive distinctly
the existence of the conflict or the policy considerations that
underlie either position.
In choosing between tenable competing interpretations of a
statute, a court should start by searching for a statutory pur-
pose that can either be attributed to the legislature or supplied
by the court itself 7 But in the host of decisions dealing with
the gift exclusion no court has considered the purpose for ex-
cluding gifts from taxable income. 8 The absence of a uniform
standard can be attributed to this omission and to the consequent
failure to identify the policy considerations inherent in each de-
cision. The remainder of this Article is devoted to identifying the
possible origins and purposes of the statute, and to suggesting the
relationship between the process of judicial decision and assump-
tions as to those purposes.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE IN
LIGHT OF TAX THEORY
It is necessary to preface the search for statutory purpose with
a discussion of the strong theoretical argument to the effect that
37. "If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some
assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or ob-
jective, is nonsens." s!lewellyn, Remarks 'o the Theory of Appellat Dc-
cision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Con.strued,
3 V. . L. REv. 395; 400 (1950).
38. 1n all the discussion of the cases in the legal periodicals the only ef-
fort to suggest an answer to this question is a very brief statement in the
article by Chommie, pupra- note 4, at 627: "Policy dictates that mere re-
allocation of benefits within'the family should not be treated on the same
plane as commercial transaction [sic]." In Stanton -. Commissioner, the
Commissioner stated only that:
The justification for exempting gifts and devises from the income tax
may be mooted, but surely at least one element of the policy is the idea
that such transfers result only in the shifting, not the augmentation, of
wealth and thus do not constitute "income" in the economic sense.
Brief for Respondent, pp. 36-37, Stanton v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278
(1960).
1963]
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there is simply no good tax policy reason for excluding gifts, or
inheritances, from the income-tax base and that consequently
the term "income" must, for tax purposes, be construed to
include gifts.a9 Before presenting this argument, however, one
semantic problem must be clarified. As a matter of common
parlance a distinction exists between the terms "gift" and "in-
come"; therefore, to treat gifts as income requires a rather broad
definition of the term "income" for tax purposes. Perhaps a more
acceptable approach would be to add gifts to wages, rents, divi-
dends and other such receipts to determine the base for what
might be called a "personal gain tax" instead of an "income
tax. '40 The term "income tax," however, has been accepted, per-
haps irretrievably, as the appropriate label for the kind of tax
that should be imposed on such gains. Thus, for tax purposes
expedience has permitted expansion of the flexible term "income"
to include all receipts that seem properly subject to this kind of
tax. To insist that gifts cannot be taxed as income because they
are not described as income in common parlance is to insist on
precision of language at the expense of sound tax policy. In this
instance precision of language may properly be sacrificed to per-
mit a statement of the issue in terms of whether income should
be defined to include gifts and inheritances.
The argument for taxing gifts as income must begin with a
brief consideration of the nature of, and the justification for, in-
come taxation. As a general proposition, governments should
provide for equal tax treatment of persons who are similarly sit-
uated. Like most general statements of ultimate goals, however,
this does not reveal a method of achieving the ideal.4 It does
indicate that the taxing authority should focus on individuals
39. This suggestion may seem somewhat startling in view of the fact that
the exclusion has been a part of the modem income tax since 1913. It is for
this reason that the argument for treating gifts and inheritances as income must
be made at this point as a basis for further discussion.
40. See MUSEAvE, Tim THEORY OF PunLic FN'Axc 162 (1959): "To
avoid semantic troubles, it might be well to refer to the income tax as an
accretion tax."
41. See Stein, What's Wrong with the Federal Tax System?, 1 TAx RE-
VISION Co IDIE Mrono, 86TH CONG., 1ST SEW. 107, 110 (Comm. Print 1959):
We start with the proposition that equals should be treated equally
as the basic standard of justice. But this does not get us far. The
troublesome question is to determine the relevant dimension for meas-
uring equality.
Compare SvmoNs, PERSONAL INcomx TA.XATION 80 (1938):
Neglecting the good ad rem levies, we may say that tax burdens should
bear similarly upon persons whom we regard in substantially similar
circumstances, and differently where circumstances differ. This may
[Vol. 48:2159.24
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and their circumstances rather than on transactions and things'2
Establishing the criterion of equality remains a difficult prob-
lem. It can be said that equality for tax purposes implies equality
of capacity to contribute to the cost of governing. The chosen
criterion should be as objective as possible."4 The amount of an
individual's annual consumption, the value of his property, or
the number of cigarettes he smokes might be workable standards,
but each seems to fall short of satisfying widely held concepts of
justice." The criterion that seems most appealing is annual eco-
nomic gains or accretions.45 Annual earned income, rents, divi-
dends-those receipts commonly labeled "income"-are cer-
tainly the major components of annual economic gains. If the
focal point is the individual and his capacity to contribute to the
cost of government, any distinction based upon the source of
receipts or the circumstances that gave rise to them seems un-
justified. Thus, if "income" is to be the criterion for determining
equality, the term must be defined broadly to eliminate such
distinctions; 46 in other words, "income" must be defined to in-
clude gifts.
seem like a waste of words; but the point is important. It furnishes
much of the case against such programs as the single tax; and impor-
tant criticisms of existing tax instruments are in the nature of protests
against this indefinable something which we call "discrimination."
42. Although this proposition may seem excessively obvious, it is fre-
quently ignored. See text accompanying notes 159-75 infra.
43. Stein points out that a tax system in which individual burdens are
determined on the basis of the tax assessor's "intimate knowledge" of the cir-
cumstances of each taxpayer could be adopted. He goes on to state that:
Such a system, "properly administered," could be very fair. Certainly, it
can take account of many relevant variables other than income. The
U.S. tax system may be trending in this direction, with the Ways and
Means Committee ... making fine distinctions in the tax treatment of
different classes of taxpayers. But it is fundamentally a ind of system
that we do not like or regard as fair. We prefer the justice- admitted-
ly rough-that comes from the even application of general rules. We
are suspicious of the kind of justice that results from case-by-case dis-
crimination among classes of citizens and taxpayers.
Stem, supra note 41, at 118. Simons favors objective criteria as a means of
avoiding "a rambling, uncharted course pointed only by fickle sentiments."
SIrONS, op. cit. supra note 41, at 31 (1938). But see text accompanying
note 60 infra.
44. See Stein, supra note 41, at 111.
45. '"The choice, as in all matters of equity, is essentially a matter of
value judgment." Musmsy, op. cit. supra note 40, at 163.
46. Simons' definition seems the best as a theoretical starting point:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of
the period in question.
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The idea that gifts should be treated as income for tax pur-
poses was argued elaborately, articulately, and most forcefully
by Simons in his classic work, Personal Income Taxation, pub-
lished in 1938. Simons' position is simply that for tax purposes,
there is no reason to distinguish gifts from other receipts: 47 "it
is hard to defend exclusion of certain receipts merely because one
has done nothing or given nothing in return '48 and "considera-
tions of equity surely afford little ground for excluding (or in-
cluding) particular receipts according to the intentions of second
parties. 49 His attitude toward the taxation of gifts was basically
determined by his views that taxes must focus on the individual
and that the best objective measure of equality of individuals for
tax purposes treats all forms of enrichment alikeY°
SimoNs, op. cit. supra note 41, at 50. This definition itself probably cannot be
used in our income tax because of many practical problems. See Surrey &
Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law lnstitute: Gross In-
come, Deductions, Accounting, Gain and Losses, Cancellation of Indebted-
ness, 66 HARv. L. REv. 761, 770 (1953). This fact does not, however, under-
cut the utility of the definition as a theoretical concept that can be applied to
answering the question of whether gifts should be included in taxable income.
As Richard A. Musgrave has pointed out:
Administrative considerations do not always permit drastic adherence
to this general concept of accretion, but this does not obviate the need
for a consistent theoretical concept. Without such a concept as a nor-
mative standard, we have no basis from which to deal with each prac-
tical problem as it arises.
MUSoAVE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 165.
47. He assumed, of course, that if gifts were taxed under the income tax,
the gift tax would have to be modified if not repealed. SimONs, op. cit. supra
note 41, at 129. He was also willing to concede some modification of his basic
scheme; for example, "some special exemptions . . . for widows and other de-
pendents incapable of self-support but not for direct heirs as such." Id. at 142.
48. Id. at 135.
49. Id. at 134.
50. Simons was careful to point out, however, that "we must avoid the
implication that our definition [note 46 supra] establishes any decisive pre-
sumption regarding policy in income taxation." SnmoNs, op. cit. supra note
41, at 57 n.19.
Simons did not deal adequately with the serious problem of distinguishing
between "gifts," which would be taxed as income and "support payments,"
which presumably would not. The conceptual difficulties and administrative
burdens involved in drawing this line would no doubt be formidable. It
can be compared with, and in fact might be related to, the problem of de-
fining "dependent" for the purpose of the dependency exemption. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 151, 152. Arguably, the gift exclusion can be explained as
a device for avoiding this kind of problem. Theoretically, the problem of dis-
tinguishing between gifts and support payments also arises under the gift
tax. Under the gift tax, however, the problem is largely avoided by the
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The Simons view of the proper definition of income, which re-
quires that gifts be taxed under the income tax,"' has been widely
accepted by economists. 2 But there is nothing particularly novel
or academic about the thinking that has led to this acceptance.
For example, a somewhat extravagant statement made by Con-
gressman Green on the floor of the House in 1924 reflects Simons'
view:
I do not see why we should tax the man who has labored hard day by
day and who accumulates small savings, sometimes a nickel, or some-
times a dollar at a time, on which he hopes to live in his declining years,
and then not tax a gift of $40,000 or $50,000. I can not imagine.53
And in 1926 Senator Norris actually proposed including gifts and
inheritances in income. 4 In defense of his proposal, Norris added
to the notion of equal treatment a good dose of the Calvinist
morality that had lurked in Mr. Green's statement:
Is it right for those who have to toil and work and then pay an income
tax on their savings that the man who neither toils nor spins should
go tax free if somebody gives him something? 55
In more recent years there has been little serious discussion of
the hypothesis that gifts and inheritances should be taxed as in-
come.'; But the idea that income should be broadly defined seems
to have gained increasing support. For example, in Commissioner
,v. GLenshaw Glass Co., 7 the Supreme Court held that money re-
$3,000 annual and $30,000 lifetime exemptions. INT. llxv. CODE OF 1954, §§
2503(b), 2521. Such exemptions would not seem appropriate under the income
tax. Moreover, the Treasury might feasibly decline to enforce the gift tax with
respect to modest transfers of questionable status, whereas taxpayer morale
and voluntary compliance might suffer seriously if the same approach were
taken to the income tax.
51. See MusGRnvE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 169. This does not mean,
however, that there can be no exceptions or modifications. See id. at 175-70.
Compare note 47 supra.
52. See MusGEALwv, op. cit. supra note 40, at 165. See also Axwu &
BRowirn=, EcoNoIcs op PuBLIc FnTAwc n 249 n.18 (1947), which states
that the "most frequently cited American proponent" of the notion that in-
come should be defined as net accretion is Hko, Tim Fnga Icomm TAx(1921).
53. 65 Com. Itzc. 3120 (1924). Although the statement seems to sup-
port taxing gifts as income, it was actually made in support of a gift tax.
The important aspect of the statement is that it focuses on the circumstances
of the recipient of a gift as compared with the recipient of wages.
54. 67 CoNe. Rnc. 3831 (1926). Compare the statement of Congressman
Hull in 1918: "Gifts, especially during the war, should be taxed at the normal
income rate, but not subjected to supertax." 56 CoNa. Rwu. 10165 (1918).
55. 67 CoNG. REc. 3832 (1926).
56. But see BRzm, A PRoGRcA FoR Fmmu TAx Emsiox 9 (Mich.
Pamphlets No. 28, 1960).
57. 348 US. 426 (1955); see Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 US. 243 (1956).
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ceived as exemplary damages for fraud or as the punitive two-
thirds portion of a treble-damage antitrust recovery must be
reported by a taxpayer as gross income. The Court emphasized the
"sweeping scope" of the statute and stated that "Congress ap-
plied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts." ' s The
same attitude toward the scope of the income tax is also reflected
by those expressing concern with "erosion of the tax base."," This
concern is only justified by accepting the general proposition, at
least as a theoretical starting point, that the income tax should
be based on net economic gain, or accretions, in which case gifts
should be taxed as income.
The fact that Congress has persistently whittled away at the
tax base through exemptions and deductions does not indicate
its rejection of a broad definition for the term "income" or its
acceptance of the idea that receipts should be differentiated on
the basis of their source. Rather, it reflects a readiness to take
advantage of the flexibility of the income tax as a device for ac-
complishing various social and economic objectives;10 such as pro-
viding tax advantages for potentially needy individuals, 1 favoring
certain "merit" wants,62 and providing economic incentives to par-
58. 348 U.S. at 427.
59. EISENSTEI1, THE IDEOLOGmS OF TAXATION 193 (1961).
60. I believe that there should be little reluctance about using the income
tax for this purpose. Otherwise, the most appealing aspect of the income
tax, its capacity to effectuate legitimate value judgments of society in a
fairly precise manner, will be sacrificed. Such value judgments cannot be
avoided if substantial tax revenue is needed. An income tax with no "special
case" provisions merely decides the relevant issues one way rather than an-
other-by default, so to speak.
Others have taken a different view. The difference between the position as-
serted by Stein, see note 43 supra, and the view expressed here is that he at-
taches much more importance to the goal of objectivity.
It may be conceded that there are many deductions and other special pro-
visions that are meritorious only in the eyes of the members of the group that
benefits from them; that the political process tends to satisfy the demands of
each such group; and the result is that special provisions with varying justifi-
cations proliferate to the point where it becomes virtually impossible to
analyze the overall fairness of the tax system. In other words, a general atti-
tude of "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" may result in a cancellation
of special provisions that is too imprecise to permit analysis of the fairness of
the system. Thus, one might conclude, as Stein says, that special provisions
should be limited to "cases of clear consensus." See Stein, supra note 41, at
112. This seems to express little more than that laws satisfying minority in-
terests in derogation of the general welfare are bad laws. One's attitude on this
fundamental issue will affect the view of the proper interpretation of the gift
exclusion- or any exclusion or deduction. See note 205 infra.
61. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 37 (credit for retirement income).
62. IN'r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (medical deduction).
228
MEANING OF "GIFT"
ticular kinds of activities6 3 The proponents of the argument that
gifts should be taxed as income seem willing to concede for the
sake of argument that these are proper objectives of the income
tax, but it seems implicit in the argument that gifts should be
taxed as income that no such objectives can be found to justify
the gift exclusion. This is a contention which assumes that the
legislature, in preserving the exclusion, acted irrationally, and such
a contention must be viewed with skepticism. It is reasonable to
suppose that the legislative record will reveal a rational legislative
purpose that will challenge the contention. However, if the oppo-
site is true the legislative history should at least reveal the events
and circumstances that led to the legislature's irrational behavior.
III. -THE -PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE IN LIGHT OF
ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY"
Any -effort to understand how and why the exemption of gifts
from .the income tax evolved requires a brief survey of the origin
and development of the income tax, the estate tax, and the .gift
tax. Of these, the first two are of principal significance; the gift
tax was largely an afterthought.
A. Gmnm'EAL AsPECTs
1. The Civil War Revenue Acts
Before the Civil War, tariffs constituted the principal source
of revenue for the federal government.6 4 After 1816 tariffs were
relied on not only -as a convenient source of revenue but also as
a means of protecting the industrial interests of the Northeast
from foreign competitionP5 The agrarian interests of the South
and-West were naturally arrayed against the protective tariff,
but as long as the revenue needs of the government were modest,
there was no sustained impetus for other forms of taxation6 The
Civil War brought about a dramatic increase in the need for funds;
aftdr some experimentation with loans, it became apparent that
the establishment of new revenue sources was essential to the
63. IT. RIv. CoDE op 1954, § 117 (exclusion of certain grants and
awards).
64. SUR= & W.&MMN, FEDERAT Ixcoam TAX TIOx 2 (1960).
65. GRovEs, FMm'r.s.c. G Govm wENT 608-09 (5th ed. 1958); PAu.,, TAXA-
ioN iN THE UNmu STATs 6-7 (1954); lATNm, AAmucAx T.AA-
TION 35 (1942).
66. Taxation of income and inheritances was seriously urged during the
War of 1812. However, pressure for this new form of taxation abated with
the end of the war. PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 6-7; RATHrn, op. cit. supra
note 65, at S4.
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preservation of the nation's solvency.67 The income tax and the
inheritance tax seemed to be obvious choices, for both had been
used in England and other European countries and had proven
to be productive and politically palatable." For each, the doc-
trinaire rationalizations that seem to be useful in rallying public
support had long since been developed; 6 the nation as a whole,
inspired by patriotism, was psychologically receptive to these bold
measures.
7 0
Competing measures undoubtedly seemed puny and shopworn
by comparison.7' The leading competitor was a direct tax on real
67. PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 8-9; RATmu, op. cit. supra note 65,
at 63-66.
68. On the income tax, see PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 72-86; Szwa-
swr, Tnm INco m TAx 57-166, 223-363 (1911). On the inheritance tax, see
I PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATB AND Gxr TAxAnON § 1.01 (1942); SuuLrz, TuE
TAxATIoN OF INm-TANcE 18-2, 34-70 (1926); WEST, Tm INnrmr'cr TAx
37-42 (Columbia Univ. Studies 1893).
In this country, death taxes had been used to a minor extent by the
states before the Civil War, but the state death taxes were not sufficiently
numerous or well developed to permit the inference that they operated as
significant precedent for the Civil War federal tax system. See Oakes, Devcl-
opment of American State Death Taxes, 26 IowA L. Rnv. 451 (1941): "The
turning point in the development of state death duties appears to have been
the enactment of the New York collateral tax of 1885." Id. at 457.
69.
An ethical doctrine is usually a barefaced assumption, backed up
by ex post facto utilitarian rationalization; when a sufficient number of
people accept it and perhaps act upon it, it becomes an ethical "princi-
ple." The tide of popular opinion changes and with it the current fash-
ion in "ethical principles": in the field of fiscal economics, the "quid
pro quo" justifications have been replaced by the "faculty" justifica-
tions; doubtless these latter, in turn, will bow before future popular
successors.
SET Tz, op. cit. supra note 68, at 198-99. Compare EisEssTm, op. cit. uUpra
note 59, which states that "taxes . . . are a changing product of earnest ef-
forts to have others pay them." Id. at 11. He then states the corollary:
Reasons have to be given for the burdens that are variously pro-
posed or approved. In time the contending reasons are skillfully elab-
orated into systems of belief or ideologies which are designed to induce
the required acquiescence. Of course, if an ideology is to be effective,
it must convey a vital sense of some immutable principle that arises
majestically above partisan preferences.
Id. at 11-12.
70. See PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 9; RATNE, op. cit. supra note 65,
at 67-68.
71. The federal government had sporadically relied on a variety of taxes,
such as excises, stamp duties, and taxes on dwellings, lands, and slaves. RAT-
mm, op. cit. supra note 65, at 27-35.
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property, which would have necessitated the administratively
cumbersome procedure of apportionment among the states accord-
ing to population s2 Moreover, this tax was widely resisted because
of its presumed discrimination in favor of investors in stocks over
farmers, and in favor of the Northeast over the Southwest and
West. The income tax was accepted as the lesser of necessary
evils.73
Opposition to income taxation was, however, quite heated and
the ensuing debate naturally focused on the basic concept at the
expense of any consideration of refinements. In fact, the first in-
come tax act, adopted in 1861,7 was so badly drafted that the Sec-
retary of the Treasury did nothing to enforce it; indeed, it was
intended to be provisional and was nullified by the 1862 act. 5
The 1862 act taxed inheritances as well as income.70 At the same
time Congress imposed a wide variety of excise and stamp taxes
and increased the tariff rates. 7 As soon as the war was over, how-
ever, the opponents of the income and inheritance taxes renewed
and intensified their attack: in 1867 they succeeded in lowering
the income tax rates; in 1870 Congress further reduced the income
tax rates and abandoned the inheritance tax; and two years later
the income tax was repealed.78
During this period the principal debate focused on the wisdom
and fairness of an income or inheritance tax and the rate of taxa-
tion. Questions relating to the scope of each tax were subordinate,
and even among these subordinate questions the proper treatment
of gifts was a relatively insignificant issue."9 The 1862 statute did
subject to the inheritance tax gifts that were intended to take
effect after death80 But the only exception to the general disre-
gard of inter vivos gifts was a provision of the 1864 statute taxing
succession to real estate;81 the provision was "so broad as to con-
72. Apportionment was required by U.S. CO NST. art. I, § 9.
73. See GRoVEs, op. cit. ftpra note 65, at 148; RAmz,E op. cit. supra note
65, at 148; SURREY & W.&nnn, op. cit. =upra note 64, at 3.
74. Act of Aug. 6,1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 309.
75. Act of July 1, 1862, c&. 119, 12 Stat. 473; see RAmTN, op. cit. Jupra
note 65, at 67-68.
76. Act of July 1,1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 473, 485.
77. PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 10-11.
78. R& UTE, op. cit. aupra note 65, at 116, 127-28, 183-35.
79. Cf. Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAxrs
581, 532 (1940).
80. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 485. The 1864 Act contained
the same provision. Act of June 80, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 285. In addition,
the Treasury issued a ruling to the same effect. See Sumz, op. cit. Jupra
note 68, at 151.
81. Act of June S0,1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 288.
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stitute virtually a tax on gifts of real estate," yet "in the brief
debates no references seem to have been made to gifts or to any
problem that might arise with respect to them. 8 2 Apparently no
one in the Treasury Department or in Congress was concerned by
the fact that all other transfers by gift wholly escaped taxation."'
2. 1894 to 1918
In 1894 the federal government again taxed incomes and in-
heritances, but this time gifts were not ignored. As before, con-
gressional action was motivated primarily by a need for revenue.
The choice of the most effective tax was not, however, dictated
solely by its revenue raising capacity. By this time the Populists
had begun to assert their influence, along with the reformers and
intellectuals; these and other similarly oriented groups favored
placing the tax burden on the wealthy. Thus, class interests were
added to the sectional interests of the South and West, which
continued their opposition to the protective tariff.8 4
The result was the 1894 Income Tax Act,88 which somewhat
remarkably included in taxable income "money and the value of
all personal property acquired by gift or inheritance."" Congress
82. Harriss, supra note 79, at 532 (1940).
83. Randolph Paul states, in a footnote to an essay on the taxation of
corporate distributions, that "the word 'income' under the 1804 Act was in-
terpreted by the Treasury to include gifts, but not to include bequests or
devises, because the latter were subject to legacy and succession duties."
PAUL, SELECTED STUDEs IN FEDERAL TAXATION 159 n.28 (2d Series 1938).
Paul cites no authority for this proposition, however, and his statement may
have been erroneous. None of the other important authors who wrote about
Civil War taxation mentioned any such Treasury practice or ruling. On the
contrary, the leading authority on this issue, C. Lowell Harriss, in his article,
Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531 (1940), cites
only the ruling of the first Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This ruling
was to the effect that gifts or donations to a minister from the members of
his congregation are taxable income when they are "in the nature of compen-
sation for services . . . " but that "gifts of money from father to son, when
clearly not in the nature of payment for services rendered . . .are not liable
to taxation as income." BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF TIIE DIREcT AND ExcIsE
TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 305 (1863).
84. PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 30-39; RATNERn, op. cit. supra note 65,
at 160-90; Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 84TH CONG.,
IST SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITy 819,
821-23 (Joint Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter cited as The Rise and Decline
of the Estate Tax], reminds us that the principal objective of the early inheri-
tance tax was to collect revenue, not to eliminate or reduce hereditary for-
tunes. Compare text accompanying notes 103-08 infra, with note 155 infra.
85. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
86. Ibid. Transfers of real property were excluded because of the asump-
tion on the part of the drafting committee that a tax on such transfers would
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demonstrated commendable sagacity by refusing to be lured into
an inviting semantic trap- it rejected the -argument that gifts
and inheritances must be exempted from the "income tax" for
the reason that they are not "income" in the traditional sense of
the word 7 Instead, Congress realized that although the label
"income tax" might have been ill-advised, the issue was not
whether gifts or inheritances were "income" but rather whether
these receipts might be combined with typical items of "income"
- such as wages, rents, and interest - for the purpose of levying
a tax on the individual.88 On the other hand, to infer that Con-
gress had anticipated a more sophisticated tax theory by con-
centrating on individual economic accretion and accepting the
idea that gifts and inheritances should be part of the income tax
base, would be unreasonable. The rate of taxation was a flat two
percent on incomes above 4,000 dollars and there was no separate
federal death tax in effect at the time. Since the rate was not pro-
gressive, the effect of the unified tax scheme was essentially the
same as separate taxes at two percent on income, on the one hand,
and on gifts and inheritances on the other. The congressional de-
bates89 strongly support the view that Congress justified the tax
on gifts and inheritances as an inheritance tax and included it in
the income tax merely as a matter of convenience. Thus, this epi-
sode in tax history does not reveal the basis for the separation of
the inheritance and income taxes. If anything, it indicates that by
1894 separateness had been accepted as a hallowed tradition that
could not readily be challenged; if gifts were to be taxed at all,
they presumably would be lumped together with inheritances
rather than with "income."
In 1895 the Supreme Court invalidated the 1894 Act in its
entirety because an inseparable part of it violated the constitu-
be a direct tax subject to the requirement of apportionment. 26 Co N. Rc.
6821-22 (1894).
87. Senator Platt stated, during debate on the bill, that personal property
acquired by gift or inheritance should be excluded because it is not "any part
of yearly income." He went on to state that in England "death duties are
very odious, and they ought to be odious in this country. They are no part
of a person's real income." 26 CONG. Bnc. 6821 (1894). The Senator did not
explain why death duties were "odious" but income taxes were not. Perhaps
he had concluded, consciously or intuitively, that the battle against the in-
come tax was lost and that the time had come to salvage what he could,
even though equally deserving candidates were beyond saving.
88. Compare text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
89. 26 CONG. RtEc. 6821-23 (1894) (reniarks of Senator Chandler). Sena-
tor Chandler said of the provision: 'It purports to be an income tax, but it
is an inheritance tax upon personal property." 26 CONG. REC. 6821 (1894). No
one disputed his point.
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tional prohibition against unapportioned direct taxes." As a result
of this decision, the federal government did not levy an income
tax again until the sixteenth amendment was ratified in 1913. In
the interim, however, the egalitarian forces of the times remained
viable. The inheritance tax gained respectability and appeal
through supporters whose theories and judgments could not be
attacked and belittled as mere self-serving rationalizations and
socialist heresies. These included the academic dissertations of
Professor E. R. A. Seligman and Dr. Max West and the more im-
passioned and extreme statements of Andrew Carnegie, who fa-
vored outright confiscation of all of a decedent's estate after mod-
est provisions for immediate heirs."' The revenue needs generated
by the Spanish-American War combined with these forces to
spawn the federal inheritance tax of 1898.2
The 1898 act was not strictly an inheritance tax. True, the rates
were higher for distant relations than for close relations. But for
all recipients the rates increased as the size of the estate increased,
not as the size of the individual's share increased. Thus, it can
properly be described as a "modified estate duty"; "the emphasis
• ..was on the tran&mission of the property""3 not on accretions
to individual wealth. In other words, it was more a tax on the
"thing" than on the person.
The 1898 statute, like its 1894 predecessor, taxed only trans-
fers of personal property,94 but unlike the 1894 act, the 1898 act
did not tax gifts other than those intended to take effect after
death. In this respect it followed the precedent of the Civil War
legislation.95 The congressional debates fail to explain this choice
between conflicting precedents, and if the opposite choice had
been made by the original draftsman of the bill, that choice might
have been accepted just as readily by Congress. There is nothing
to indicate that the exclusion of gifts from the inheritance tax
implied an intention to include gifts as a proper part of an income
tax system. Prior and subsequent historical evidence is clearly to
the contrary. The one general observation that does seem justified
90. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, decision on re-
hearing 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
91. PAuL, op. cit. .upra note 65, at 65-66; RATNme, op. cd. 8upra note
65, at 235-36; SmULTZ, op. cit. .supra note 68, at 196; WEST, Op. Cit. supra note
68, at 113-14.
92. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, §§ 29-40, 30 Stat. 448, 464-66, amended
March 2, 1901, ch. 806, §§ 10-11, 31 Stat. 938, 946-49.
93. Smyurz, op. cit. 8upra note 68, at 153-54.
94. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
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is that the problem of gift taxation was not considered one of
great moment.
By 190 the need for revenue had sufficiently diminished to
enable the opponents of the inheritance tax to bring about its
repeal.98 The victory was temporary, however, as the agitation
for inheritance and income taxation continued. Ultimately, the
outnumbered opponents of both taxes were unable to turn the
tide of popular sentiment.
3. 1918 and Afterwards
By the time of the adoption of the modem income tax in 1913,11
a pattern had been established: incomes and inheritances were
subject to separate systems of taxation; gifts were given little, if
any thought, but when they were considered they tended to be
placed in the same category as inheritances. In 1913 this pattern
became firmly embedded. The income tax enacted in that year
contained graduated rates ranging from one percent on the first
20,000 dollars of taxable income to seven percent on amounts over
500,000 dollars. It excluded "property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise or descent." ' There was no federal tax levied on transfers
at death or by gift. This failure to tax, although probably of no
great significance in this study, was not the result of mere over-
sight. Senator Norris introduced an amendment that would have
imposed an estate tax with fairly modest rates for estates under
1,000,000 dollars, increasing to 75 percent of the amount of an
estate in excess of 50,000,000 dollars.9 His avowed purpose was
to "break up the swollen fortunes,"'100 an objective that could not
have been achieved under the income-tax rates of that time. Nor-
ris' amendment evoked little opposition in the Senate debates,
but it was defeated by a vote of 58 to 1.11 On the day this vote
was taken, an amendment embodying an inheritance tax was de-
feated by a vote of 39 to 99.102 The legislative rejection of, and
apparent indifference to, these proposals surely cannot be inter-
preted as a manifestation of confirmed opposition to the concept
of taxing death transfers. The more plausible explanation is that
many members of Congress who might have supported modified
96. Act of April 12, 1902, ch. 500, § 7, 32 Stat. 96; PAuL, op. cit. *upra
note 65, at 67.
97. Act of Oct. 8, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166.
98. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, cl. 16, § I[ (B), 38 Stat. 167.
99. 50 CONG. REC. 4422 (1913).
100. 50 CONG. Exo. 4426 (1913).
101. 50 CoNG. REc. 4468-69 (1913).
102. 50 ConG. lIEc. 4459-61, 4470 (1913).
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versions of these proposals did not want to divert their own and
their colleagues' attention from the main issue - "income" taxa-
tion.
With the adoption of the sixteenth amendment the proponents
of income taxation had scored a major advance. Tactically, the
battle over the inheritance tax could wait. During this period the
exclusion of transfers by gift and inheritance from federal taxa-
tion resulted in a gap in the taxation of transfers of assets between
individuals. This gap, however, does not seem indicative of a gen-
eral conclusion that such transfers were not properly taxable.
Rather, it indicates an intention to subject inheritances at least,
if not gifts, to a different system of taxation than income.
The federal death tax, enacted in 1916,103 was strictly an estate
tax - all inheritance tax features were abandoned. 1 ' The tax was
proposed and supported as a means of raising revenue for military
purposes.'05 This revenue-raising objective contrasts with the cur-
rent notion that the main objective of federal death taxation is to
"break down hereditary estates,"' 10 but as in the cases of the
Civil War and the Spanish-American War provisions,0 7 does not
explain why this tax was selected in preference to others. One ex-
planation may be that the estate tax was a familiar and seemingly
convenient, practical means of raising revenue. The idea of an
estate tax, however, had additional appeal for that substantial
segment of the public that wanted to impose a heavier tax burden
on the wealthy and attack family fortunes.10 Of course, the rates
adopted could not be expected to raise substantial revenue or to
bring about a peaceful social revolution. They ranged from one
percent for estates under 50,000 dollars to ten percent for amounts
over 5,000,000 dollars. 09 But for that era these rates represented
a significant achievement for the forces of egalitarianism." 0
103. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-12, S9 Stat. 777.
104. The significance of this fact is indicated in note 110 infra.
105. PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 105-06; RAThER, op. cit. supra noto
65, at 354-56.
106. The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax 819.
107. See text accompanying notes 64-67 & 82-84 supra.
108. See PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 108.
109. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 200, 39 Stat. 777.
110. The estate tax is, of course, an imprecise method of attacking heredi-
tary wealth. The tax increases with the size of the estate rather than the size
of individual shares; as such it may impose a heavy tax on estates that, al-
though large, are divided into enough shares so that no single recipient may
be getting rich. To the extent that this scheme of distribution occurs the tax
seems more an attack on the mere accumulation of wealth than on its per-
petuation in transmission from one generation to the next.
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Although gifts had been excluded from the income tax in 1913,
they-were also excluded from taxation under the estate-tax system
enacted in 1916. This hiatus lasted until 1924, when Congress fi-
nally imposed a gift tax."' Even then, gift taxation was not con-
sidered an independently justifiable levy, for it was adopted to
protect the estate and income taxes by removing the exemption
for inter vivos transfers2- The gift tax, like the estate tax, was
based on the transfer rather than the receipt of property; conse-
quently, the rates of the gift tax depended not on the amounts of
gifts received by an individual but on the amounts of gifts made
by an individual during the year. Furthermore, the 1924 gift tax
rates were identical to the estate tax rates."13
In'1926 the provision for gift taxation was repealed,1 1 4 and the
federal government returned to a system of taxation that may
seem, by present-day standards,"3 to contain an inexplicable gap.
The gift tax returned, however, in 193110 and has been continu-
ously in effect since that time. The subsequent legislative history
relating to the gift tax does not concern questions that cast any
additional light on the definition of "gift" within the meaning of
the income-tax exclusion. Congress did consider that problem in
1954, in connection with the income-tax treatment of prizes,
awards, and grants.ll 7 Its action, however, was in response to a
111. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 04, §§ 319-24, 43 Stat. 313-10.
112. See Harriss, supra note 79, at 533-35; Magill, The Federal Gift Tax,
40 CoL-urw. L. Ruv. 773 (1940). Dr. Max West had argued, in his thorough and
scholarly study in 1893, that "for the purpose of preventing evasion of the
inheritance tax it seems sufficient to make the [gift] tax applicable to gifts
causa mdrtis, as is usually done." He went on to state that "a tax on all gifts
would be impossible to enforce, even if it were otherwise desirable." WEst, Tim
INHEumA_cE TAx 170, 300 (Columbia Univ. Studies 1893). In the next major
American study of inheritance taxation, W. . Shultz took the position:
"While a tax on gifts 'made in contemplation of death' must be considered
supplementary to the inheritance tax, a general gift tax covering all gifts inter
vivos should not. It is a separate independent transfer tax, with problems and
considerations peculiar to itself ... ." SHULTZ, op. cit. supra note 68 at 328.
113. A tax advantage would nevertheless be achieved by disposing of part
of an estate through inter vivos gifts. The amounts transferred inter vivos and
the amounts transferred at death would both be subject to the lower end of
the rate schedule before the higher end was reached. Moreover, the amount
of the gift tax paid would be eliminated from the estate.
114. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 125.
115. For the views of the scholars of an earlier day, see note 112 supra.
116. Revenue Act of 1932, cl. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 245 (1932). The circum-
stances that led to this action in 1932 are discussed in a subsequent part of
this Article. See text accompanying notes 150-55 infra.
117. Ix . RLv. Coan OF 1954, §§ 74, 117.
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rather narrow problem"" and does not reveal the congressional
conception of a "gift" or the purpose for excluding gifts from the
income tax.1 9
B. SPECIFIC ASPECTS
The above discussion has indicated the absence of any express
legislative purpose for the gift exclusion. Yet certain specific as-
pects of the historical record may be of potential significance in
determining whether any such purpose can reasonably be inferred.
1. The Fact That for a Time Gifts Completely Escaped Taxation
One of the most intriguing phenomenon in the historical de-
velopment of gift taxation is the fact that for most of the period
from 1916 to 1932 gifts were not taxed while estates were. Since
most gifts apparently take the place of, or have the effect of, the
distribution of an estate on the death of the owner,120 it seems
that "the tax system should be neutral as between transfers by
118. In 1945, the Tax Court held that a prize from the "Pot 0' Gold" radio
program was a gift rather than taxable income because the recipient, whose
name was picked from the telephone book, had expended no effort whatso-
ever. Pauline C. Washburn, 5 T.C. 1S33 (1945); see Glenn v. Bates, 217 F.2d
535 (6th Cir. 1954); Fernandez v. Faks, 144 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
Adopting the same approach, the Supreme Court in 1952 held that a prize
received by one who had composed a symphony for a contest was taxable in-
come because the recipient had consciously entered the contest and had ex-
pended effort to win the prize. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
On the other hand, the Nobel and Pulitzer prizes were not treated as taxable
income. Rev. Rul. 54-110, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 28.
Under the 1954 Code, prizes constitute taxable income unless they are
awarded in recognition of good works and the recipient took no action to enter
the contest and is not required to render future services. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 74. Scholarships and, within limits, fellowships are not taxable. INT.
RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 117.
119. This is largely attributable to the fact that §§ 74 and 117 were a small
part of the massive revision of the Code in 1954.
120. Actually, some deviation from the "commonly accepted" meaning of
the word "gift" is required to limit it to such transfers. A person might con-
ceivably make transfers during his life that would not be regarded as part of
a fixed plan for the distribution of his estate upon death; for example, a mod-
est gift to a friend or former employee who is in dire financial circumstances.
Certainly the overwhelming majority of transfers of large amounts, the only
transfers on which the gift tax has any substantial impact, would satisfy the
death-transfer-substitute criterion. See GROVES, op. cit. supra note 05, at 244:
It is not the purpose of the gift tax to tax "support" or "token" gifts.
The tax is aimed at substantial transfers which are attempts to pass
property from one generation to another.
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gift inter vivos and transfers by bequest at death."'-' To achieve
this equality gifts must be taxed under the estate-tax system.'2 2
Yet the apparent need for correlation might be misleading; there
may be reasons for taxing death transfers that do not apply to
inter vivos transfers. An analysis of the reasons for taxing death
transfers and of the applicability of these objectives to inter vivos
transfers may reveal a clue to the meaning of the term "gift" as
used in the income-tax exclusion. s
Two of the objectives of death taxes are quite closely related
and often intertwined, for both derive from a dissatisfaction with
the pattern of distribution of wealth. The first objective is to limit
the amount of wealth that can be kept within a family and passed
from one generation to the next.'24 It is projected most clearly by
the arguments that evoke the image of the idle male offspring who,
by virtue of inheritance, acquires great wealth without working a
day in his life;'2 5 in other words, the attack is more upon the per-
petuation of wealth than upon its accumulation or existence. This
objective may be termed "anti-dynastic."
The second objective is simply to tax away the large fortunes
as such, without much concern for who holds them or what is done
11. HARmias, GIFT TAXATION In TB:E UNrrED S&TEs 6 (1940). Harriss
asserted that the sole justification for the gift tax was the need to prevent
avoidance of the income tax and the estate tax. Id. at 1, 6. Nonetheless, I find
in the quoted passage an additional, independent justification.
122. The argument for taxing gifts under the estate-tax system rests on the
assumption that there should be separate approaches to the taxation of estates,
on the one hand, and income, defined to exclude at the very least death
transfers, on the other. Once this assumption is granted, the possibility that
gifts should be taxed under the income-tax system may be excluded from con-
sideration. The only serious question, then, is whether gifts should be taxed as
a part of the estate-tax system, or as part of a system closely correlated to it,
or not at alL Now the assumption is one that most current economists would
not be willing to concede. See text accompanying notes 49-52 mupra. What
must .be conceded, however, is that the assumption reflects a very basic and
apparently irrevocable congressional choice. For this reason the assumption
can be granted for the purpose of the present discussion of the question of how
the failure to impose a gift tax can be reconciled with the taxation of estates.
128. This discussion will be concerned with objectives. The numerous theo-
ries of death taxation, which may be regarded as mere rationalizations, will
not be mentioned here. For a penetrating discussion of such theories, see
SHLTZ, op. cit. mpra note 68, at 167-99. Shultz concludes his discussion with
the iconoclastic statement quoted in note 69 8upra. Another compilation of
the theories is contained in a report to the Joimt Committee on Internal Rev-
enue Taxation. 11 STAPF OF Jo=iN CommrrTEE oz Irnmz-x RuVENU TAXA-
TIoN, FxDERAT AND STATE DEATH TAxEs pt. 2, at 97-101 (1933).
124. See text accompanying notes 97-100 & 103-08 supra.
125. See, e.g., 50 CoNG. Rnc. 4424 (1913) (remarks of Senator Norris).
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with them; the attack is not on the perpetuation but rather on
the accumulation of wealth. The occasion of transfer at death is
selected as the best time to accomplish this objective. This view
is exemplified by a statement made by Andrew Carnegie in 1889:
"By taxing estates heavily at death the state marks its condemna-
tion of the selfish millionaire's unworthy life."1 20 Further, mani-
festations of the same view may be found in two once-popular
theories: (a) the state is a co-owner of all property and (b) the
estate tax is imposed in lieu of taxes that should have been im-
posed earlier. 27 This view of the estate tax as an outright attack
on wealth was summarized by an authoritative 1926 study: "In
the case of the inheritance tax, at least, we have, of recent years,
seen the sham trappings of rationalized legal or ethical excuses
cast aside, and the tax boldly approved or condemned, as the case
may be, because it is borne to a large extent by a rich minority of
the population."'2 " This objective may be termed "anti-accumula-
tions." The third objective of the estate tax is simply to raise
revenue.
129
Logically, these three objectives serve as independent motiva-
tions for gift taxation, but for practical reasons, they may be
somewhat less compelling as motivations for gift taxation than for
estate taxation. The anti-dynastic objective obviously applies to
transfers by gift that are part of a distribution of family assets to
members of the younger generation. 30 A gift is just as much a
means of transmitting wealth and just as much a "windfall" to
the recipient as is an estate distribution. It seems likely, however,
that inter vivos gifts are generally thought of as being substan-
tially smaller in amount than transfers at death. Logically, this
should make no difference since it is taken into account in the
rate structure. It may nevertheless have substantial psychological
impact; in the minds of legislators, the image of gift transfers may
be quite insipid as compared to transfers at death.
The anti-accumulations objective of the estate tax is clearly
applicable to the gift tax. In determining whether a tax fulfills
this objective, the only question that need be answered is whether
126. Carnegie, Wealth, 148 NORTH AmrIcAN R.V. 653, 659 (1889).
197. See SHuLTZ, op. cit. supra note 68, at 173-76, 183-85.
128. SnuLTZ, op. cit. supra note 68, at 190.
129. See note 84 supra.
130. By assumption, these gifts are the only ones under consideration here.
See note 120 supra. Only two propositions are presently being demonstrated:
(a) for some gifts at least there are purposes for taxation apart from the desire
to protect the income and estate tax, and (b) the purposes are essentially the
same as the purposes for estate taxation.
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the tax falls primarily on the wealthy. The gift tax certainly has
as much potential in this respect as the estate tax. This conclu-
sion depends, of course, on the proposition that the estate tax, in
so far as it is used to accomplish the anti-accumulations objective,
is wholly arbitrary in its selection of the taxable event and that,
accordingly, the date of gift is just as appropriate a moment of
reckoning. If this is so, then instead of waiting for either event,
the objective might be accomplished by imposing an annual tax
or, better yet, by constructing an income tax that prevents ac-
cumulations in the first place.13' The reason why this latter sug-
gestion seems to go too far may lie in the notion that, for purposes
of incentive and to satisfy natural human acquisitiveness, a man
should be permitted to accumulate substantial wealth; but at the
moment when the individual parts with his accumulated wealth,
the countervailing public desire to reduce inequality takes preced-
ence.13 2 If this is so, then whether the individual parts with his
wealth by choice through gift or by necessity at death should not
determine the taxability of the receipt.1 33 However, there may be
another, less rational, explanation for the date of death as the best
moment for accomplishing the anti-accumulations objective:
It is much more merciful to avaricious human nature to deprive
it of something it has never had then to lop off anything- however
superfluous -which has actually been enjoyed .... On the whole, I
131. Compare the remarks of Senator Clapp, in the Senate discussion in
1913 of Senator Norris' proposal for an estate tax. 50 CONG. fREc. 4424 (1913).
Senator Clapp supported the proposal as a means of reconciling the public to
instances in which heirs become rich without effort; but he perceived an ele-
ment of folly, if not injustice, in taking by taxation that which had been per-
mitted to be accumulated in the first place. He suggested that Congress should
study methods by which the people might retain "in the first instance ...
that which properly belongs to them" instead of letting a man make "millions
to which he is not entitled."
132. See Sneed, The Rule of Good Law and Federal Taxation, 2 B.C. Lx"n.
& Com. L. REv. 203, 208-09 (1961):
To me, man is the product of tensions caused by the antinomies of his
nature.... He is inclined to be generous in giving aid to others;
but he is also selfish and acquisitive .... He believes in equality; but
he also strives for inequality....
These and other antithetical characteristics shape man's institutions
and the best and most durable of them are those which permit temper-
ate expression of such traits and predispositions.
138. Since gifts are made by choice, the gift tax may impede such trans-
fers. To the extent that this results, it merely means that the tax will be post-
poned until death. Theire may be a public policy in favor of encouraging inter
vos dispositions, but this does not affect the basic motivation for gift taxa-
tion; it merely requires a refinement by which gifts are taxed at a rate slightly
lower than estates.
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can see no better way to diminish the natural pangs attendant upon
paying taxes than to collect as much income as possible in the fleeting
moments when the property belongs to no one in particular. 84
To the extent that this observation is an accurate representation
of the public mind, the estate tax may be preferable to the gift
tax on the simple pragmatic ground that it is more palatable. This
does not mean that the gift tax fails to serve the same objectives
as the estate tax; it merely means that because of the peculiarities
of the public attitude, the objective may be accomplished one way
but not another.
The revenue-raising objective of the estate tax is served as well
by the gift tax as by the estate tax. The estate tax may be ex-
pected to raise considerably more revenue than the gift tax, but
the total amount of revenue produced is not the proper test of
the desirability on revenue grounds. If it were, then most excise
taxes would have to be discarded; but many modest revenue pro-
ducers can, in combination, produce as much as a single large pro-
ducer. If the cost of collecting the tax is reasonable in relation to
the amount collected, then the revenue raising objective is satis-
fied.
The history of the gift tax sustains its role in raising revenue.
Even in 1925 the amount raised was by no means insignificant.
In that year the gift tax produced 7,500,000 dollars in revenue and
the estate tax produced 101,400,000 dollars,'85 while in the same
year the federal excise tax on trucks produced about the same
amount as the gift tax.3 6 If the excise on trucks can be considered
a good source of revenue, then so can the gift tax. 7 The fact re-
mains, however, that although the gift tax may be as "good" a
source of revenue as any other tax, it is not as critical a source.
In other words, when Congress passes up gift taxation, it may be
passing up a "good thing" from a revenue standpoint, but the loss
134. Kate Field's Washington, Feb. 8, 1893, as quoted in WEST, op. cit.
supra note 68, at 113-14; see Sneed, Taxation, 11 J. PuB. L. 3, 11 (1963).
135. 1925 COMM' OF INT. REV. AN. Rm. 70. In the same year the indi-
vidual income tax produced 845.4 million dollars, the corporate income tax
916.9 million dollars, and the tobacco tax 345.2 million dollars.
136. The amount was 7.8 million dollars. Ibid. In 1962 the estate tax pro-
duced 1,796.2 million dollars while the gift tax produced 239 million dollars
and the tax on trucks and buses 256.3 million dollars. 1962 Comnr'n OF INT.
REV. ANN. REP. 152-53.
137. The point to be made here is that there is an independent revenue-
raising objective of the gift tax, but it should be recalled that the gift tax has
an added and perhaps more significant revenue function as a protector of the
income and estate taxes.
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of that revenue will not be as noticeable or distressing as a loss of
the revenue from the income tax would be.p3s
To summarize, transfers by gift serve much the same wealth-
distribution function as transfers at death. Moreover, the objec-
tives that motivate the taxation of death transfers should equally
motivate the taxation of gifts; thus, the failure to tax gifts seems
theoretically incompatible with the taxation of estates. This does
not mean that either the gift tax or the estate tax is good or bad,
just or unjust, ethical or unethical, or moral or immoral. Even if
such a judgment were possible, it is not necessary for the pur-
poses of this discussion. But as a matter of logic, the taxation of
one and not the other must be the product of a process other than
reasoned choice based on an intelligible theory of taxation. There-
fore, contrary to what might be expected, the failure to tax gifts
from 1913 to 1924 and from 1926 to 1932 does not reveal any
rationale that will help to define the word "gift" as used in the
income tax exclusion. This episode in history may be ignored in
the search for such a definition.
If the process were not one of reasoned choice, then it may
have resulted from factors, in addition to those mentioned above,
that an historical analysis should reveal. Although such an analy-
sis will probably be as speculative and inconclusive as the above
analysis, it will serve to challenge the hypothesis that the choice
must have been made on the basis of some undetected rational
theory.
Turning to the historical record, the most crucial fact is that
during most of the period from 1916 to 1932 the estate tax itself
was under major attack. Although the attack was successful only
in reducing rates, its goal was repeal, and in fact, the continued
existence of the tax was frequently in peril. The attack was based
on a deep antagonism toward the whole concept of an estate tax.
Whether this antagonism derived from principle or from self-
interest is unimportant; the important point is that the antago-
nism existed, that it was virulent, and that it was politically po-
tent.'39 The fortunes of the gift tax seemed to vary with the vigor
138. Possibly there was some thought in 1916 that a tax on gifts would
be more difficult to enforce than a tax on death transfers. Transfers by gift
may be quite informal and secret, while death transfers involve formal docu-
ments, lawyers, and courts. This seems to be a weak reason for abolishing the
gift tax, but even if this administrative problem does help to explain the fail-
ure to tax gifts, it is the kind of explanation that does not help determine what
a gift is.
139. See PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 121-42; IATmn, op. cit. supra
note 65, at 415-16, 424-30; Harriss, supra note 79, at 535; The Rise and De-
dine of the Estate Tax 826-28.
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of the support for the estate tax. The gift tax was adopted in
1924, when the estate tax rates were raised to an historic high; it
was repealed in 1926 when the estate tax rates were substantially
reduced.40
The failure to expand the scope of the estate tax to include
gifts may be explained by these facts. Suppose that flawless rea-
soning could demonstrate that if estates were to be taxed then
gifts should also be taxed. The opponents of estate taxation might
have no answer to the argument. If these opponents were deeply
committed to the notion that the estate tax is a bad tax that
ought to be abolished, and should there be a reasonable prospect
of abolition, as there was,'141 then their acceptance of the conclu-
sion that gifts should be taxed, would be unlikely. Acceptance of
the gift tax might be evidence of the permanency, and perhaps
even the wisdom, of the estate tax and any relief, however capri-
cious, from the despised tax would not be sacrificed merely for
the sake of consistency. Thus, they would oppose the gift tax even
though they would not dispute its natural correlation to the estate
tax; some would no doubt find rationalizations that would remove
the inconsistency.
Should this group lose the battle on the estate tax, it might
enlarge its numbers sufficiently to win on the gift tax, by enrolling
some uncommitted legislators who would not favor the estate tax
enough to push it to its logical extreme in the face of heated oppo-
sition. For many in the uncommitted group, the immediate image
of gifts would probably vary from that of estates; to them the in-
consistency of taxing one and not the other would not be iminedi-
ately apparent. Their interest in the problem would be insufficient
to go beyond the immediate image, and even if it were, they might
not be disturbed by the inconsistency. Their apathy toward the
relatively insignificant gift tax would result in a victory for the
group that devoted the most energy to the issue. During the 1920's
all the extra energy was at the disposal of the opponents of the
gift tax. The supporters were "on the defensive, fighting to pre-
serve the estate tax, and were, therefore, in no position to fight
for increasing its effectiveness." '42
140. See RALTNF, op. cit. s-upra note 65, at 419, 425.
141. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 139; The Rise and Decline of the
E8tate Tax 826.
142. Harriss, supra note 79, at 535-36.
While this analysis seems to me the most plausible, it is not the only pos-
sible analysis. It may, for example, over-emphasize the strength of the oppo-
sition to the estate tax. After all, the supporters of the tax were strong
enough to preserve it. On this view, with the forces more evenly balanced,
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This analysis explains the inertia between 1916 and 1924 more
effectively than it explains the affirmative act of repeal of the
gift tax in 1926. In that year, however, opposition to the estate
tax had reached its peak." 3Moreover, there were additional fac-
tors favoring opponents of the gift tax. In the first place, the gift
tax of 1924 was poorly drafted, so that it operated somewhat
capriciously and unfairly.'" The attack on the concept of gift
taxation was no doubt materially assisted by the weakness of the
particular gift tax law with which Congress had had experience. 48
Second, the 1924 gift-tax rates were no lower than the estate-tax
rates. 46 This added to the concern of those who favored early dis-
tribution of estates and feared that the gift tax discouraged inter
vivos transfers.j47 Moreover, in 1926 "tax reduction was the order
of the day"'' 48 as both the income and estate tax rates were re-
duced substantially. Congress was simply in a magnanimous mood
toward the wealthy, and it could inexpensively sacrifice the gift
tax.149
the outcome of the issue of gift taxation becomes far more uncertain; the
outcome is likely to turn on legislative inertia or on behind-the-scenes ac-
tivity that never appears in the public record. This kind of analysis, however,
would also support the hypothesis that the failure to tax gifts was not the
result of a reasoned policy choice. Neither analysis conclusively disproves the
hypothesis that the failure to tax gifts was based upon some rational theory,
but either underscores the deficiencies of that hypothesis.
143. See note 139 supra.
144. SHULTZ, op. cit. supra note 68, at 163.
145- Ibid.
146. See text accompanying notes 112-13 supra.
147. Harriss, sui'ra note 79, at 534, refers to "an argument which appears
occasionally in the debates, namely that death taxes are to encourage the
breaking up of estates and to prevent the concentration of wealth but that
a gift tax, hindering the making of gifts, would impede rather than encour-
age this basic objective of death taxes." This argument seems to be faulty
for it is based on the unverified and probably unwarranted assumption that
inter vivos gifts have a greater tendency to break up estates than do trans-
fers at death. Although the argument may have been faulty, it may never-
theless have appealed to some Congressmen who generally supported the ob-
jectives of the estate tax.
Compare Report to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation:
As has been stated before, the rates of the gift tax (as of 1033) are
approximately one-fourth less than those of the Federal estate tax. The
reason for this difference in rates appears to be that Congress wishes
thereby to encourage the making of gifts and the distribution of property
in the lifetime of the owner, which, of course, is a worthy purpose.
STAFF OF JomT Commn= oN Ii;=NAT T xATIOr, upra note 193, at 76.
(Emphasis added.)
148. Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40 CoLiti. L. REv. 773, 774 (1940).
149. Magill states that the estimated revenue from the gift tax was only
2 million dollars and thus the tax "was fairly marked for slaughter." Ibid.
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By 1932 hostility toward wealth had increased.5'5 At the same
time there was a widespread belief among conservatives that addi-
tional revenue was badly needed. 5' Even Andrew Mellon - who
had been Secretary of the Treasury under three Republican Presi-
dents during the 1920's and "the chief political representative of
concentrated wealth"' 2- had conceded the battle against the es-
tate tax. "Torn between his dislike for deficits and his dislike for the
estate tax," the Secretary had reluctantly chosen to recommend
an increase in its rates.'53 The opposition to the gift tax suffered
from precisely the same conflict: "The lack of opposition [to the
gift tax] was probably due to the fact that the men who would
ordinarily have opposed the bill were demanding a balanced budg-
et and a sales tax - strategically a very weak position."' 4 Thus,
as in earlier years an increased need for revenue corresponded
with a rising tide of egalitarianism. 5' As a result, the income and
estate tax rates were raised and the gift tax returned permanently.
2. The Fact That Inheritances Are Not Taxed as Income
This historical survey has not as yet revealed a rationale that
would be useful in defining the term "gift" as used in the income-
tax exemption. Before abandoning the quest, however, one aspect
of the record and of the statute itself merits further analysis -
the fact that gifts seem to be placed in the same category as in-
heritances. It is obviously inadequate to observe simply that
"gifts" are "like" inheritances. Inheritances have many character-
istics: they are generally non-recurrent; they are made volun-
tarily; they are usually received by members of the decedent's
150. See The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax 827-28.
151. Magill, supra note 148, at 775; see RATNER, op. cit. supra note 05,
at 447-50.
152. RATNER, op. cit. supra note 65, at 414.
153. PAUL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 155.
154. Harriss, supra note 79, at 581, 535-36.
155. Eisenstein places all the emphasis on the revenue need:
When the estate tax was finally revived at the end of this dismal
period [i.e., in 19321, the controlling motivation was a desire to obtain
revenue and not a desire to break down estates. Among those who made
tax policy the levy was still a fiscal measure.
The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax 828. The revenue motive is not suffi-
cient to explain the adoption of one tax in preference to another. See text
accompanying notes 103-08 supra. Thus, in 1932 the need for revenue ex-
plains why opposition to estate and gift taxation was weak; it does not fully
explain the strong support for estate and gift taxation that took advantage of
this weakness. In the same year there was vigorous backing for a general sales
tax, which was not adopted. RATNER, op. cit. supra note 65, at 446-47.
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family; they are a means of distributing an estate. For purposes
of taxation, isolation of the significant characteristics depends on
the establishment of an acceptable rationale for exempting inherit-
ances from the income-tax system and taxing them under the
estate tax. In other words, the congressional "good reason" for
adopting the two separate tax systems must be determined. The
"good reason" refers to a choice based on criteria derived from
some meaningful conception of the purpose of the tax system
apart from raising revenue. 56 If no such reason appears, the com-
parison of gifts to inheritances would result in a quantitative
analysis of earmarks conducted with no basis for determining how
much weight to attribute to each earmark.
Unfortunately, the development of the two separate systems
can be explained most plausibly in terms of expediency and reac-
tion to ephemeral circumstances. It is extremely difficult to find a
"good reason" for the development.
The initial adoption of separate systems for taxing inheritances
and incomes in this country during the Civil War can be attrib-
uted largely to the fact that the two systems of taxation had been
fully developed in Europe157 and thus had the advantages of fa-
miliarity and precedent -they could be expected to provide the
needed revenue with a minimum risk of public disfavor. The peo-
ple whose interests are adversely affected by any new tax will
always predict unfavorable consequences, but in the case of the
tested income and inheritance taxes such predictions would have
a somewhat hollow ring. 58
Thus it seems that Congress, in adopting the Civil War taxes,
relied on precedent rather than reason; but it also seems that
the precedent itself was not founded in reason. The most plausible
explanation for the original irrationality may be found in the fact
that the estate and income taxes .were initially regarded as taxes
on "things." At the present time, tax specialists consider the in-
come and estate taxes primarily as taxes on the person. Moreover,
there is a tendency to assess all taxes in terms of their impact on
individuals. Much of our current tax system, however, can be
156. Although the revenue-raising goal does not indicate the reason for
selecting one tax in preference to another, it should not be minimized as a
tax objective.
157. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
158. An interesting comparison can be made between the frightening fore-
casts as to the effect of the adoption of the income tax in England at the
beginning of the 19th century with the similar, but somewhat less strident,
forecasts as to the effect of the adoption of the same tax in this country a
century later. See PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 74-78, 100-02.
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explained only as an effort to avoid the unpleasantness of recog-
nizing the impact of the demands of government on the individual.
This unpleasantness is avoided by imposing the tax on some in-
animate, impersonal "thing."'10
The phenomenon of taxing things rather than persons may be
described as a device by which the people can avoid facing reality,
or as a means by which politicians are able to hide the harsh facts
from their constituents. The fact is, however, that many taxes can
be understood only if they are thought to fall on "things." A lead-
ing example is the highly productive corporate income tax 0° that
was originally imposed because the government was unable or un-
willing to raise personal income taxes to supply a growing need for
revenue. 6' The tax is virtually impossible to defend either on
grounds of equity or economic policy. To the extent that it is
shifted forward through increased prices it amounts to a well dis-
guised capricious consumption tax. To the extent that it is shifted
to labor or other factors of production it is again capricious and
probably introduces into the tax system an unintended source of
regressiveness. And to the extent that it falls on shareholders it
will result in relative over-taxation or under-taxation of the share-
holders depending on their income-tax brackets and upon whether
after-tax profits are distributed. Moreover, it no doubt results in
indiscriminate and unintended distortions in the allocation of
goods by the free-market system. It does serve as a device for
dealing with the problem of undistributed profits; but as such it
is a most inept, if not arbitrary, device. Apart from this, about all
that can be said for the tax is that it raises a large amount of
much-needed revenue and that if it has been shifted to consumers
or factors of production or borne by former investors, its repeal
would result in a windfall to the current owners of corporate
shares.'62
There are many other taxes whose sole virtue is that they raise
159. This theory of a tax on "things" is analogous to the idea that the
term "income" is often used to convey a "conception of what may be called
'income from things.' " See SnloNs, op. cit. supra note 41, at 44.
160. See Buehler, The Taxation of Business, in RFP'A.isAL or Busi-
NEss TAXATmON 3, 38-40 (Tax Institute 1962); Buehler, The Theory of Busi-
ness Taxation, in TAXATION AND BUSINESS CONCENTRATION 231 (Tax Institute
1952); Rudick, Preface, in How SHOULD CORPORATioNS Bz TAX? vii (Tax
Institute 1947).
161. See PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 94.
162. See Groves, How Shall Business Be Taxed: Basis for Reappraisal, in
REAPPRAISAL OF BUSINESS TAXATION 3 (Tax Institute 1962); Kust, Taxation
of Business, in id. at 25. See also Burck, You May Think the Corporate Profit
Tax is "Bad" But . - . , Fortune, April, 1963, p. 86.
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some revenue- for example, most of the excise taxes. The diffi-
culty in determining who pays these taxes is sufficient to make
them undesirable. To the extent that a government relies upon
such taxes, its action is best characterized by the following pas-
sage from Randolph Paul:
David A Wells, at one time Commissioner of Internal Revenue .
referred to the traditional Irishman on his first visit to Donnybrook
Fair who said: "Wherever you see a head, hit it." Wells added: "Wher-
ever you find an article, a product, a trade, a profession, a sale, or a
source of income, tax it. '1u 3
According to this philosophy, whether the head that is hit deserves
to be hit is not a matter for serious concern. A system of taxation
based on this kind of approach may seem to produce appalling
results in terms of its impact on individuals. It may be more ap-
pealing to adopt such an approach, however, than to face the
responsibility of confronting each individual in society with the
knowledge of the dollar amount of his contribution to govern-
ment. 64
Reliance on taxes on "things" seems to have been even more
prevalent in earlier societies than it is now; a regressive analysis
of history reveals an increasing reliance on such taxes' 0 5 Indeed,
"the Greeks and Romans objected to direct taxes in any form;
they regarded them as 'derogatory to the dignity of a free citi-
zen. "'66 This does not imply that people are now or ever were
completely unaware of the impact on the individual of taxes on
"things."'16 The reaction against the protective tariff in this coun-
163. PAuL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 28.
164. This does not imply that all ad rem taxes are bad. In certain limited
circumstances they are quite defensible, as, for example, where "the current
activities of governments confer special benefits upon particular classes, where
the classes are not regarded as proper objects of subsidy, and where special
levies upon them are feasible." SrmoNs, op. cit. supra note 159, at 32. But
even in such cases the tax is often associated with the thing and not with
the individual who pays it. And there are many ad rem taxes for which no
satisfactory justification can be found.
165. This phenomenon may be attributable in part to the fact of increas-
ing understanding of the taxing process with the passage of time. It may
also be a result of administrative necessity: A meaningful computation of
individual income is, of course, essential to a tax on the person. No such com-
putation is feasible, however, in an economy in which there is a substantial
amount of barter and income from the performance of services for oneself.
166. GuovEs, op. cit. supra note 65, at 611.
167. Indeed, taxes on "things" are sometimes imposed in a manner de-
signed to yield a rough approximation of an income tax. Thus, in Great Brit-
ain there was a tax on, among other things, the carriages of the wealthy, the
windows of the middle class, and the shops of the poor. This eventually de-
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try at the end of the 19th century is an example of a directly op-
posite attitude. 68 The fact remains that the tax is first thought of
as falling on the thing itself.
The appeal of taxing things rather than people explains much
of the thinking about inheritance taxes and, perhaps to a lesser
extent, even the income tax. W. J. Shultz reached the conclusion
that in the traditional theoretical justifications of the inheritance
tax "it was property and not individuals and their circumstances
that was considered."' 169 This would be even more true of an estate
tax than an inheritance tax.
The idea that "income" also is a "thing" rather than a measure
of the tax-paying capacity of individuals found expression in the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Eisner v. Macomber in
1920.17° In dictum that had a profound impact on the development
of the notion of what kinds of receipts should be taxed as income,
the Court stated that" 'income may be defined as the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets. . ". ."' This dictum placed the emphasis on the
source of the receipt, rather than the tax-paying capacity of the
individual. 72
The influence of the same kind of thinking appears in the writ-
ings of the eminent Professor E. R. A. Seligman. In his treatise
on the income tax published in 1911, he wrote that the provision
veloped into a primitive form of income tax, The Triple Assessment, that fi-
nally gave way to the income tax. See GROVES, op. cit. supra note 65, at 615;
PAul, op. cit. supra note 65, at 72-73; SJIOaAN, op. cit. supra note 08, at
57-72.
168. See text accompanying notes 64-67 & 84-87 upra. Just as the in-
come tax was adopted as a means of redressing the inequity of the tariff, its
ancestor, the faculty tax, was used to achieve greater equity in situations in
which chief reliance had previously been placed on the property tax. See
RATE, op. cit. supra note 65, at 51-54.
169. SHuLTz, op. cit. supra note 68, at 187. Henry Simons stated:
"Death duties and gift taxes, in the main, are levies upon things or upon acts
of transfer; they are essentially ad rem charges which take no account of the
total circumstances of the recipient." In Simons' theory the income tax was
a tax on persons rather than things. Yet he was aware that others might
mistakenly take a different view and therefore was careful to point out that
"the income tax is not a tax upon income but a tax upon persons according
to their respective incomes." SnmONs, op. cit. supra note 43, at 128.
170. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
171. 252 U.S. at 207.
172. See, e.g., Wright, The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits Upon
the Supreme Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 STx. L. REv. 164 (1950).
Compare note 159 supra.
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of the 1894 Revenue Act subjecting inheritances to the income tax
was "illogical."' It was "illogical" because incomes and inherit-
ances were separate things and a tax on one therefore could not
extend to the other. In a later work, however, Professor Seligman
recognized that there were competing theoretical justifications for
the inheritance tax: 174 in one theory "it is a tax on the individual;
in the other a tax on the thing... . ,,175
The existence of separate taxes for incomes and inheritances
and the concurrent dissatisfaction with the results may be ex-
plained on the basis of this tax-on-things analysis. The separate
taxes were adopted because different things might reasonably be
subject to different taxes, just as different import duties may rea-
sonably be imposed on coffee and steel. This explains why the tax
system is as it is, but it does not explain why anyone might ra-
tionally conclude that it ought to be that way. Taxes must ulti-
mately be judged in terms of their impact on the individual. 170 A
consideration of the impact of the income and estate taxes reveals
the irrationality of the system of separate taxes; the irrationality
is readily illustrated.177 This explains the dissatisfaction. A tax on
"things" will not be consistent -except perhaps fortuitously -
with any rational scheme for distributing tax burdens. In other
words, there is no justification for the results when measured
against the only criterion by which taxes can rationally be ap-
praised. As a result, the outer limits of each tax cannot be defined
with reference to any tenable objective of taxation, and such ref-
erence must be made in formulating a satisfactory definition.
On the other hand, even though the process by which the sep-
arate taxes were adopted is basically irrational, the effect may
not be. Separate taxes may effect a distribution of burdens that
roughly approximates the result that would have followed a con-
173. SmaGxuN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 514.
174. SEwrG5 , Essa ys n TAxAION 136 (10th ed. 1925). While Seligman
noted that inheritances "dearly add to the ability of the individual," he
stated that because they are "irregular" there is "no room for" them in a
"logical income tax." Id. at 133--4.
175. Id. at 136. In 1925 E. R. A. Seligman wrote:
so far as the recipient of an inheritance is concerned, the accretion to
his capitl wadeah through an inheritance is just as much income, in the
broadest sense of the term, as that which comes from gifts or capital
gains or other irregular or aleatory sources. Yet for practical reasoi*
the inheritance is not included in the taxable income ....
S ax AN, Smmrs 3N PUBLIC F xc 160-61 (1925). (Emphasis added.)
176. This seems true by and large even if a tax is judged in terms of its
effect on the growth and stability of the economy.
177. See text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
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scious consideration of differences in personal circumstances. If
the opposite were true, the increasing awareness of the impact on
individuals probably would have demanded the abolition of sepa-
rate taxes. This conclusion suggests that the major differences
between incomes and inheritances must be analysed to determine
whether these differences reflect, even roughly, a distinction be-
tween individual circumstances that justifies different tax bur-
dens. 17
The dominant distinction between inheritances and the most
common kinds of income lies in the irregularity of the former as
opposed to the regularity of the latter. This factor might justify
different treatment on the ground that the recipient of an inherit-
ance may have a "bunching" problem. That is, under the pro-
gressive income tax, he may pay a higher tax than an individual
who received the same amount over a number of years. Yet there
may be no appreciable difference in the circumstances of the indi-
viduals that justifies a different tax. The resulting inequity could
be eliminated by some sort of averaging device designed to spread
the bunched income over several years. Averaging may not be
administratively feasible, however, and therefore less satisfactory
solutions might necessarily be adopted.
The most familiar alternate form of relief is to tax the irregular
receipt at the lower capital-gain rate. This is a most inept means
of dealing with the problem; for example, it may result in a tax on
bunched income which is much lower than the total taxes that
would have been paid if the amount of the receipt had been spread
over the entire life of the recipient. This inept solution to the prob-
lem may nevertheless be regarded as better than no solution at all,
and it does point out the distinction between irregular and regular
receipts, in terms of a rational tax objective. Unfortunately, this
does not contribute much to the solution of the basic problem of
defining the term "gift." The notion that inheritances receive spe-
cial treatment because of their irregularity might justify a pre-
sumption against treating a receipt as a gift unless it is irregular.'79
178. Even if Congress did not act, even intuitively, in response to these
distinctions, the courts may be justified in relying on them if doing so is the
only means by which the statutory terms used by Congress can rationally be
given meaning. This is merely an extension of the idea that courts not only
can, but must participate fully in the law-making process. See, e.g., Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 69 (1911).
179. This can only be a presumption since there will be some regular re-
ceipts that must be treated as gifts unless the idea that words used in a
statute have no meaning at all independent of the presumed purpose of the
statute is carried to an absurd extreme. I reject that extreme position be-
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But since there are obviously many forms of irregular receipts
that are subject to the income tax, an additional theory would be
required to determine which irregular receipts will be exempt
from the income tax and which ones will not.
A second possible distinction between inheritances and income
is that inheritances are usually transfers within an immediate
family group. If the immediate family is regarded as a unit for
purposes of taxation, then transfers of assets within the unit are
of no tax significance because the heirs merely receive legal title
to assets that they always considered their own.O8 In the case of
many small estates the immediate family, operating as a financial
unit, receives most of the estate assets. To include such inherit-
ances in taxable income might reasonably be considered unfair;
in other words, if such receipts are to be taxed at all, it can be
argued that the rate should be much lower than that on income.
There may be other reasons as well for special treatment of mod-
est estates where the breadwinner dies: a loss of his earning power
has occurred and the family probably feels poorer rather than
richer. It is a bad time to ask for taxes l'8 The exemption of all
cause it seems to undercut one of the basic objectives of a statute-the ob-
jective of providing people with a simple, straightforward means of knowing
how they are going to be treated. Thus, where a father gives his adult son
a check for $1,000 every year for twenty years at Christmas, I would
say that the receipt should be considered a "gift" even if the sole purpose
of the gift exemption is to provide special treatment for irregular receipts.
This type of treatment can be defended, in terms of legislative intent, by
pointing out that while the purpose of Congress was to provide special treat-
ment for gifts, it also had a general purpose to create a document, the In-
ternal Revenue Code, that would have some utility in itself for the people
to whom it is addressed.
180. See MusGRAvE, THE THEORY OF PuBLIc FiANcE 175 (1959). Com-
pare the suggestion that support payments must be distinguished from gifts.
See note 50 supra.
181. In fact, only anticipated income has been lost, and arguably such a
loss is not cognizable in taxation, because the survivors are no worse off than
families who never had a breadwinner to lose. This is, however, a somewhat
Draconian view, to say the least. It does seem true that the person who has
been living on an income of $10,000 per year and must adjust to an
income of $5,000 has suffered a setback that leaves him in a somewhat
worse position than the person who has never earned more than $5,000
per year. At the time of death there are, of course, other, less tangible losses
as well. Perhaps the tax system should not attempt to assess and compen-
sate for this kind of setback. But Congress has apparently thought otherwise
in at least one other instance; it has exempted from taxation recoveries for
personal injuries even where the recovery is for lost wages. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 104 (a). Other kinds of damage recoveries have been exempt from
taxation by administrative ruling and judicial decision. E.g., Hawkins v.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
inheritances from the income tax represents a poor solution to this
kind of problem, and imposing an estate tax rather than an inher-
itance tax compounds the error.'82 But the separate taxation of
inheritances, even under an estate tax, may again seem a better
solution than none at all. On this basis, if the only choice is be-
tween taxing death transfers under an estate tax and taxing them
under the income tax, the choice of the estate tax may be reason-
able.
At the other extreme are transfers of very large fortunes within
a family. Here are the anti-dynastic objective, 83 one of the prin-
cipal objectives of death taxes, is relevant. For example, suppose
that A inherits 1,000,000 dollars on the death of his father and B
receives 1,000,000 dollars for the sale of a piece of otherwise worth-
less property on which oil is unexpectedly discovered. If the ob-
jective is to prevent perpetuation of wealth within a family, a
higher tax should be imposed upon A than upon B. Stated in other
terms, extreme wealth may be acceptable as long as everyone has
an equal chance to achieve it. 84 "This is essentially the justice of
the distribution of prizes in an unrigged game that all can play." 85
Much of this kind of attitude appears in statements made in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the basic contours of our
tax system were being formed.18 Among the supporters of the
income tax there was a discernible sentiment in favor of adopting
much higher estate-tax rates than the then-contemplated income-
tax rates. 87 This sentiment was based largely upon the dislike of
the perpetuation of wealth within families; in other words, upon
Commissioner, 6 B.TNA. 1023 (1927); Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 Cum,. BULL. 92 (1922);
see Knickerbocker, The Income Tax Treatment of Damages: A Study in the
Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47 CoNmEi, L.Q. 429 (1962).
182. Under an inheritance tax a distinction can be made between gifts
to immediate kin and gifts to strangers. Even under an inheritance tax no
distinction has been made between those immediate kin who are dependent
upon the decedent and those who are not.
183. See text accompanying notes 124-30 supra.
184. See BLUm & KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
86-87 (1953).
185. Stein, Whats Wrong With The Federal Tax System?, 1 TAX REvIsION
CoMTENDruM, 86TH CONG., lST SESS. 107, 111 (Comm. Print 1959). The
quoted sentence, in context, makes a point somewhat different from that for
which it is used here. See also Musa~vxw, THE THEORY OF PUBLIc FINANC E
176 (1959).
186. For example, Senator Norris proposed a top rate of 75% for the estate
tax at a time when there was no serious suggestion that the income-tax rates
should be anywhere near as high. See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
187. See Dos PAssos, INHERITANcE TAx LAW § 1 (2d ed. 1895); PAUL, op.
cit. supra note 65, at 65-66, 87-90; RATNERI, op. cit. supra note 65, at 48-49,
97-98, 129, 192.
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a dislike of family dynasties supported by hereditary fortunes. Of
course, the development of the estate and income taxes has not
been consistent with this somewhat punitive attitude toward in-
herited wealth; ss generally speaking, the estate tax produces a
lower tax burden than the income tax.6 9 There may, however,
be hopes of altering this situation, and the fact remains that large
inheritances evoke a different image than large receipts from other
sources.
Summarizing the discussion of small and large inheritances,
there may be acceptable reasons for exempting inheritances from
the income tax and subjecting them to a separate tax system-
even though the estate tax is a clumsy device for effectuating the
presumed goals. The reasons suggested have to do with the fact
that inheritances are usually transfers within a family. There will
be many cases in which a "plain meaning" approach to statutory
interpretation9 0 will require that transfers not falling within the
intra-family category be treated as inheritances. In doubtful cases,
however, it would be reasonable to hold that a transfer to a per-
son who is not a family member should not be treated as an in-
heritance. And if "gifts" are thought to be transfers that are
'ike" inheritances, the same interpretive tool can be applied.
A third distinction between inheritances and income may be
based on the motivations behind each type of payment; income
is received in return for something of commercial value - a quid
pro quo, while inheritances are usually received solely because of
love or affection. As long as the courts attach significance to the
common understanding of the meaning of statutory language, the
distinction will play a significant role in the search for a solution
to the gift-or-income problem. Thus, the presence or absence of a
188. See Bloch, Economic Objectives of Gratuitous Transfer Taxation, 4
NAT'L TAx J. 139, 140 (1951):
Although the general thesis that acquisition of wealth by inherit-
ance is socially less desirable than acquisition of wealth by personal
efforts seems to find a wide range of defenders, in practice the taxation
of personal income developed much more rapidly than the taxation of
inherited wealth. A proposal like that of Henry C. Simons, who fa-
vored the taxation of property received by inheritance or gifts at the
same level as ordinary income [footnote omitted) is considered quite
radical, although the underlying theory is very conservative.
189. This assumption is probably justified as a general proposition. Yet
if an estate is distributed among a large number of beneficiaries the estate
tax may, depending on the beneficiaries, take a heavier toll than an income
tax on each of the inheritances-especially if inheritances are subject to an
averaging provision under the income tax.
190. See note 179 supra.
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quid pro quo may be decisive as to a vast number of transfers and
it may serve to limit the area of controversy. But a definition of
quid pro quo for the purposes of the difficult cases arising under
the gift exclusion and an analysis of its significance in relation to
other factors will depend on the reason why it is considered rele-
vant to that exclusion. Such a reason is difficult to discover. If
personal income were thought of as shares of national income, and
national income cannot increase in the absence of a quid pro quo,
then there could be no increase in personal income without a quid
pro quo. Henry Simons has pointed out, however, that the notion
that total personal income for tax purposes cannot add up to more
than national income is fallacious;191 if this is true, the quid pro
quo distinction is useless in providing a definitional tool.
The significance of quid pro quo may lie in a distinction be-
tween earned and unearned income. Congress has, in the past, fa-
vored earned income.'92 An explanation in these terms is incon-
sistent, however, with the fact that, in the lower ranges of income
the estate and gift taxes provide a lower tax than that imposed on
earned income. The absence of quid pro quo, therefore, is a signifi-
cant characteristic of inheritances, but is useless in explaining why
inheritances are exempt from the income tax.
Another possible distinction between "income" and inherit-
ances is frequently asserted by those who strongly oppose the tax-
ation of inheritances. The distinction is that inheritances are com-
monly regarded as "capital," while income is not. 9 3 According to
those who make this assertion, only an insidious tax system would
permit the imposition of any tax on "capital." Even the most
superficial analysis, however, reveals some very serious defects in
the reasoning that must underlie this conclusion. Acceptance of
the conclusion demands acceptance of the initial proposition that
191. SIMONS, op. cit. supra note 43, at 47.
192. The means was the earned income credit, which was in force for
most of the period from 1924 until World War IT. PAuL, op. cit. supra note
65, at 136, 177, 360.
In 1911 Seligman had stated:
Especially in modern times, with the immense growth of private
fortunes, it has come everywhere almost instinctively to be recognized
that an income derived solely from an individual's own strenuous per-
sonal exertions ought not to be treated in the same way as the income
which comes, let us say, from government bonds or from the securities
of a corporation in the management of which the bondholder or stock-
holder actually takes no part.
SELIGaNU, op. cit. supra note 68, at 23-24.
193. See, e.g., PAUL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 134; SHIULTZ, op. cit. sizpra
note 68, at 169.
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people react differently toward periodic earned income on the one
hand, and inheritances on the other. Presumably people equate
inheritances with "capital" in the sense that they must be in-
vested, rather than used for consumption. This is certainly not
true of all inheritances; and many prudent individuals similarly
feel compelled to save and invest a part of their earned income.
Thus, the distinction is based on what is at best an imperfect fac-
tual assumption. 94 Both large and small inheritances may be used
for consumption. Moreover, if only relatively large inheritances
are considered capital, the distinction may disappear in light of
the fact that large, non-recurrent items of earned income are also
usually invested rather than used for consumption. Consumption
is usually adjusted to predictable, periodic receipts, and an argu-
ment for special treatment of large, non-recurrent receipts should
not be limited to inheritances.
Even if inheritances are usually invested and earned incomes
are usually used for consumption, there may be no basis for dis-
tinction. It might be argued that to impose a heavy tax on
amounts that normally are invested would deplete the supply of
funds available for investment and thereby impair economic
growth and possibly even reduce the existing stock of capital. The
prophets of gloom no doubt overstate their case on this issue. "No
tax directly destroys capital.!' 9 5 If the curtailment of economic
growth is the point of major concern, other provisions of the tax
law may more than offset any adverse effects of a high tax on
inheritance. 96 Phrased in these terms, the objection is somewhat
less than valid; apparently it is a mere rationalization, rather than
a motivating consideration behind the exemption of inheritances
from the income tax system.19 7
Even if the potential adverse effect on capital accumulation is
a rational motivating factor in the adoption of the exemption, it
adds nothing to the search for a definition of the term "gift."
Arguably receipts should be treated as gifts if they are the ldnds
of receipts that are commonly regarded as "capital" in the sense
194. See HAnmass, op. cit. supra note 121, at 7.
195. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, s5 Txns
247, 248 (1957).
196. See HAmusS, op. cit. supra note 121, at 7-9; Sanurz, op. cit. supra
note 68, at 201-06; Bloch, supra note 188, at 141; Blum, supra note 195, at
248.
197. The argument that the knowledge that accumulated wealth will be
subjected to a substantial tax upon death will destroy, or at least impair, the
incentive to save and invest has similar appeal and similar weakmesses. See
SHIJLTZ, op. cit. supra note 68, at 206-07. This is quite similar to the proposi-
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that they will ordinarily be invested, rather than used for con-
sumption. The present understanding of human behavior, how-
ever, does not permit an accurate prediction of the type of receipts
that will be invested, at least for the purpose of dealing with re-
ceipts whose status as "gifts" under the income tax has been the
subject of litigation over the past forty years.
Nevertheless, the courts could make some effort to utilize the
distinction between capital and income. They would, of course,
be compelled to rely primarily on the unscientific data of personal
experience; but they constantly rely on this type of process in
making decisions. The courts might better decide cases on the
basis of an intelligent estimate of whether a receipt is commonly
regarded as capital, rather than concede that the decision must
be made irrationally. The distinction between capital and con-
sumable receipts would be useful in only a limited number of
cases, and would provide only a negative presumption,05 but that
might be better than no standard at all.
Another possible basis for objecting to taxing "capital" is that
such receipts are not available for consumption and therefore
should not be regarded as part of the measure of taxpaying ca-
pacity. This argument meets the problems of determining com-
monly held beliefs and attitudes discussed in connection with the
immediately preceding argument. More fundamentally, it repre-
sents an implicit rejection of the theory that income is the best
measure of taxpaying capacity. If our tax system favors receipts
tion that the income tax impairs the incentive to work; it may be a fair de-
scription of the effect of the tax on some individuals, but not of the overall
effect. "The effect of death taxation on the incentive to invest cannot now
be estimated." Bloch, supra note 188, at 142. A high estate tax may well en-
courage greater accumulation, so that the after-tax amount equals what is
regarded as a minimal estate. Andrew Carnegie thought that "captains of
industry built up great fortunes, not so much for the sake of their posterity
as for the pleasure involved in the struggle for wealth." PAuL, op. cit. supra
note 65, at 66. In addition, the effect of the entire tax system on capital ac-
cumulation must be considered; for example, what if the revenue gained from
a higher inheritance tax were used to reduce the corporation income tax? Fi-
nally, the inclusion of inheritances in taxable income, subject to a fair aver-
aging device, might well result in lower total death taxes than the present
estate tax. Cf. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUI TAXA-
TION, supra note 123, at 103, pointing out that "the estate tax produces more
revenue than the inheritance tax at similar rates."
198. This is so because there will be many receipts that may be regarded
as capital but dearly are not gifts, as well as some receipts that may not be
regarded as capital and clearly are gifts. Compare discussion in note 179
&pra.
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in the form of inheritances because people do not consider them
available for consumption, there is no reason to deny this favorit-
ism to that part of earned income that is, by virtue of some per-
sonal compulsion, saved rather than invested. This would lead to
a tax on expenditures or consumption rather than income.
Income, however, seems by far the more appealing measure of
taxpaying capacity. This is, of course, a matter of value judg-
ment; 99 it cannot be "proved" and is difficult to explain. An ex-
penditures tax favors receipts used to increase personal wealth;
this tax can be ultimately justified only by accepting the theory
that the tax laws should be used to enhance and reinforce tend-
encies toward inequality of wealth °0 This argument would obvi-
ously find little public support today.
20
'
Before leaving the topic of distinctions between incomes and
inheritances, the argument that taxation of inheritances inter-
feres with the transferor's right to enjoy his property must be
disposed of 20 The argument attempts to establish a distinction
based on the position of the donor rather than the donee. Surely
no one would argue that if X pays his gardener 4000 dollars per
year, the gardener should not be taxed because doing so inter-
feres with X's "right" to use his property. The argument is equally
without merit in the case where X pays 4000 dollars per year to
his son, out of pure love and affection. While X probably does not
want his son to be taxed, he is not so concerned about the gar-
dener. Tax consequences, however, cannot be permitted to turn
on considerations such as this.
199. See note 45 supra.
200. The accumulation of small amounts of capital may reflect the very
respectable desire for security and self-sufficiency. To favor gifts and inherit-
ances on this ground, however, is to discriminate egregiously against those
who can satisfy the same desire only by setting aside a portion of their pe-
riodic earned income.
An expenditures tax would not necessarily significantly increase inequali-
ties in wealth. Perhaps most people have a fixed saving goal that would not
be affected by tax considerations.
201. This analysis may not do justice to the expenditures tax theory;
such a tax can be defended on grounds of both equity and economic policy.
See KALDoR, Ax Ex E-DInuim TAx (1955); Goode, Income, Cowumption, and
Property as Bases of Taxatiom, 52 Am . EcoN. REv. 327 (1962). See also An-
thoine, Tax Reduction and Reform: A Lawyeres View, 63 CoLmin. L. Rnv.
808, 809 (1963). Perhaps the basic appeal of the expenditure tax theory
would explain why our federal income tax departs as much as it does from
the accretion theory of income.
202. This attitude was expressed as follows in the dissenting opinion in
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 140 (1929): "The right to give away
one's property is as fundamental as the right to sell it or, indeed, to possess
it." The opinion goes on to state that a gift tax is a tax "on property."
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CONCLUSION
This review of the theory and legislative history of the gift
exclusion clearly indicates that the exclusion is not the product of
a reasoned legislative choice and does not reflect, with any reason-
able degree of precision, any legitimate objective of tax policy.
Lacking purpose, the provision makes little if any sense, a fact
that encumbers effective and consistent judicial construction of
the statute. Several possible approaches to this problem may be
briefly compared to determine the most workable method or meth-
ods of interpretation.
Under one approach the courts would become willing partners
in the development of the law. There is, of course, a large area in
which there is no opportunity to affect the application of the gift
exclusion, however arbitrary it may seem. The courts are not free
to eliminate the gift exclusion, regardless of their concurrence with
the reasons for doing so. In ambiguous cases, however, the courts
could accept guidance from the theory that points in that direc-
tion. Thus, a court might reasonably accept the theory that the
ideal of a tax on accretions depends on a broad definition of in-
come.203 Under this theory, the gift exclusion would be given as
narrow an application as the language of the statute permits; the
courts might adopt a rule sharply limiting, if not eliminating, the
application of the gift exclusion to transfers made in a business
context.
2 04
As a second approach, the courts might go even further in devel-
oping the law in accordance with their views of proper tax objec-
tives. For example, while "income" should be defined broadly, a
court could consistently adopt the theory that the income tax
should be used to accomplish various social objectives such as
relieving from taxation persons thought to be needy.205 The term
208. See text accompanying notes 41-62 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
205. Willingness to adopt this kind of approach would depend on the
view of the function of the income tax as discussed in note 60 supra. The use
of the gift exclusion to accomplish this kind of objective is exceedingly ca-
pricious. For example, suppose an impoverished minister retires without any
funds to live on and his congregation spontaneously establishes a pension
fund for him or gives him a retirement "gift." Such payments have consis-
tently been held to be within the gift exclusion. See, e.g., Schall v. Commis-
sioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949); Rev. Rul., 55-422, 1955-1 CuM. BULL.
14. Such tax favoritism may be regarded as recognition of the recipient's
meritorious occupation as well as his need. Yet if a provident, responsible
congregation provides for a modest pension long in advance of retirement
the amounts received are taxable income. Alvin T. Perkins, 34 T.C. 117
(1960).
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"gift" might be construed, then, to encompass transfers made for
charitable purposes, judged as objectively as possible.
The gift exclusion arguably constitutes a pro tanto rejection
of the broad definition of income, and any attempt to apply the
theory of this broad definition to limit the exclusion might be
thought to exceed the limited lawmaking function of the courts.
A court that accepted this view and that could find no applicable
statutory purpose might consider that its only alternative was to
attempt to determine the colloquial meaning of the statutory lan-
guage. As suggested above,20 the question in each case would
then be whether the transfer in question corresponded with the
commonly held image of a gift.
A fourth approach would be to conclude that there is no statu-
tory purpose, that none can be supplied from general principles,
but that the legislative history does provide a clue to what Con-
gress intended. Thus if gifts were thought by Congress to be like
death transfers, and death transfers were treated specially because
they were thought of as transfers within a family,20 then in doubt-
ful cases, a court could construe the term "gift" to exclude trans-
fers that bear no significant similarity to transfers within a family.
Any one of these approaches appears to be defensible, although
the first seems by far the most appealing. Vacillation between the
various approaches, however, is not defensible. MKany of the lower
court-decisions are consistent with the first approach;20 s some of
the law seems consistent only with the second;20 9 and the Supreme
Court decisions, and some of the lower court decisions, seem con-
sistent with the third.210 The decisions do not clarify the reason-
ing process upon which they are based, and this fact is a principal
source - together with the lack of legislative purpose - of the
persistence of conflict and confusion. Suppose that the Supreme
Court had written its opinion along the following lines:
"We are confronted with the problem of a statute whose pur-
pose we are unable to determine. The legislative history is useless.
We find in some lower court decisions a tendency to resolve the
206. See text accompanying notes 20--23 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 179-89 supra.
208. See notes 24 & 34 supra.
209. See Crown, Payments to Corporate Executives' Widows, N.Y.U. 19TII
INsT. oN Fm. TAx 815, 826 (1961): "We venture the thought that widows
can expect tax immunity only where the proof establishes that the directors'
were concerned with the widow's financial plight, that the amounts bestowed
were geared to the widow's economic needs and not equated to her departed
husband's salary."
210. See text accompanying notes 6-11 & 26-32 supra.
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issue in a manner calculated to accomplish social objectives (such
as helping the needy) which, though commendable, are not the
purpose of this statute and can only be accomplished under this
statute in a most capricious fashion. We disapprove this tendency.
On the other hand, we can understand and sympathize with a de-
sire, manifested in many other lower court decisions, to limit the
gift exclusion in accordance with the general policy (which we
have endorsed in other cases) of defining income broadly. But we
do not believe that that policy can be applied in this instance
because it cannot be reconciled with the effect of the exclusion as
applied to transfers whose status as 'gifts' cannot be disputed.
Therefore, we are forced to adopt the admittedly unsatisfying ap-
proach of looking to the colloquial meaning of the term 'gift.' In
our view this means that the question whether a transfer is a gift
must turn on the state of mind of the transferor; on whether he
was motivated, generally speaking, by pure beneficence."
The Supreme Court could have indicated, in some such man-
ner, a recognition of the nature of the problem, the appeal of
competing solutions, and the reason for adopting its approach; in
other words, it could have explained what it was doing and why.
If it had done so, the conflict and confusion found in the lower
court decisions could have been reduced, if not avoided. In fact,
the Court merely indicated that the issue turns on the state of
mind of the transferor - as if that proposition were self evident.
In Duberstein the Court arguably was bound to follow Bogar-
dus and therefore was not free to make new law. A discussion of
the merits of this argument exceeds the scope of the present Arti-
cle. Even if the Court was bound by Bogardus, it should have used
the Duberstein opinion as a vehicle for explaining Bogardus along
the suggested lines. Otherwise there was little point in devoting its
time to the case. If the meaning of Bogardus had been clear and
the lower courts had merely been misled, by later cases, into re-
jecting the Bogardus rule, then a simple per curiam reaffirmation
would have been sufficient. The history of post-Bogardus litiga-
tion, however, clearly indicates that Bogardus did not end the
controversy and that a mere reaffirmation and restatement was
not sufficient to prevent future controversy.
The gift exclusion is one of those provisions -by no means
unique, especially in tax law - for which no statutory purpose
can be found or supplied. This does not mean that a reasonable
degree of certainty and predictability cannot be achieved; inter-
pretive rules, where needed to remove ambiguities, can, of course,
be developed. Yet, the rules that are developed will seem arbi-
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trary; as Karl Llewellyn pointed out, such rules will not "make
sense. ' 21' In an area such as taxation, different judges are likely
to hold deeply seated values that conflict to a greater or lesser
extent with the values held by other judges. In these circum-
stances the results in individual cases may reflect an implicit re-
jection of the arbitrary rule in favor of the judge's own view of
the proper goals of taxation. In other words, judges can be ex-
pected to strive constantly to "make sense" out of a statute, in
terms of their own value system. This apparently has happened
in the gift cases. If consistency and predictability are to be
achieved, an identification of the pertinent values and goals, and
a clear explanation of the reasons why certain of these should or
should not be regarded as controlling, is essential to an achieve-
ment of consistency and predictability. This is particularly im-
portant in an instance such as the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the gift exclusion, where the objectives that were rejected
have gained wide acceptance in other areas.
While the courts can reduce uncertainty and litigation, only
Congress can resolve the basic issues in this area. Legislative re-
consideration of the basic question of whether gifts and inherit-
ances should be excluded from the income-tax base would be ex-
tremely useful. The problem of the proper tax treatment of gifts
and inheritances raises a fundamental issue of tax policy: the
proper standard for measuring tax-paying capacity. If this diffi-
cult problem is not solved, the provisions of the tax system will
be irreconcilable with any intelligible, coherent scheme of values;
the system's dominant theme will be the capriciousness that re-
sults from accepting on grounds of transitory political expediency
first one value then its antithesis. Such a tax system may be re-
garded as the inevitable product of our non-authoritarian political
system, having the virtue of accommodating, with a minimum of
antagonism, the conflicting demands of individuals and groups
with widely divergent values. This view is unacceptable to me, at
least as applied to the issues considered in this Article. I find no
evidence to support the view that the gift exclusion is a product
of the kind of compromise, or that the reification of gifts is the
kind of psychological device, that has social utility. I do not be-
lieve that the issues raised by the gift exclusion are sufficiently
difficult or conflict-laden to justify legislative avoidance. More-
over, I feel certain that identification and optimum resolution of
the pertinent diverse values in this area has not been achieved.
211. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appeaate Decaion and Rules
or Canon, About How Statutes are to be Construed, S VAiN,. L. Rrv. 395,
400 (1950).
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